C O M P A R AT I V E S T U D Y It must be noted that the research papers mentioned above use different methods to measure the quantitative interpretation of reasonable doubt in different groups of citizens. Two methods (or, more precisely, two groups of methods) are most commonly used for these types of measurements. With the application of the so-called “direct methods” of assessment, one measures the abstract attitude of respondents on the minimum degree of proof that they believe is required for conviction. These are called “self-report” methods.323 These are simpler methods that generally yield higher results, namely around 0.9 on a probability scale of 0 to 1 or 90% on a scale of 0 to 100%, and are in this regard closer to the moral and theoretical discussions.324 On the other hand, methods called indirect methods appear to be closer to the real situation of making decisions in practice, because, in addition to the interests of suspects, they include a more complex evaluation of the interests of society and of the victim, and thus comprise a process of finding the appropriate balance between the favourable and detrimental effects of conviction and acquittal.325 In this regard, the decision-making criteria include more complex formulae that measure the use (detriment) of 4 values or situations: 1) acquitting the innocent; 2) convicting the innocent; 3) convicting the guilty, and 4) acquitting the guilty.326 It appears that these “indirect methods” are closer to real life situations, because, in addition to abstract liberal values, they also reflect real concerns about fighting crime, victims’ interests etc. It is more than understandable that, in addition to the difference of results depending on the method applied, results also differ depending on the population sample of the specific survey, with the value of the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt varying from 50 to 100% probability. Most research shows that the degree of probability expressed by judges is approximately 90%,327 with the highest values measured among university students (91-99%).328 The modest domestic research on the standard of proof conducted amongst legal practitioners (judges, prosecutors, attorneys and civil society observers) and law students did not give at substantially different results than those expressed in corresponding surveys in the USA when it comes to the application of the direct method. The standard was evaluated with highest values by judges and university students as proof of approx. 90% probability.329 323 See R. Hastie (Ed.), Inside the juror: The psychology of juror decision making, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 84-115; Kagehiro, D. K., Defining the standard of proof in jury instructions, 1Psychological Science, 1990, 194-200. 324 See Dhami, supra. 325 See S. S. Nagel, Bringing the values of jurors in line with the law, 63 Judicature, 1979, 189-195; S. S. Nagel, M. G. Neef, Decision theory and the legal process, Lexington Books, 1979. 326 See Dhami, supra. 327 See R. J. Simon, Judges’ translations of burdens of proof into statements of probability, 13 Trial Lawyer’s Guide, 1969, 103-114; R. J. Simon, L. Mahan, Quantifying burdens of proof. A view from the bench, the jury, and the classroom. Law and Society Review, 1971, 319-330. 328 See McCauliff, supra; Dhami, supra. 329 For the purposes of this study conducted was the first modest attempt to quantify the degree of probability by surveying a100 number of domestic legal practitioners, law students and observers from civil society organisations monitoring court proceedings. 73