C O M P A R AT I V E S T U D Y to the opinion that the art piece is fake. There are situations when there is not one but many opposites. In such a case, it is improbable that the person would believe in all opposites that caused the reasonable doubt unless there is evidence that would lead him/her to be inclined to a particular opposite. However, the person will surely distance themselves or will fully abandon the thing that is uncertain about. The standard that the guilt shall be proven beyond reasonable doubt already places the doubt in a position to benefit the defendant’s innocence because the doubt is in the guilt. So, if there is a reasonable doubt in the guilt of the defendant, it is natural for one to incline towards the opposite, and that is defendant’s innocence. Nonetheless, as afore mentioned, the principle of in dubio pro reo can also apply to the guilt. Namely, if at the end of the trial and after evaluating the evidence the judge doubts whether the facts that define the crime exist, the judge, in fact, doubts the defendant’s guilt. Hence, even though the principle in dubio pro reo does not require acquittal per se, but requires a decision which is more favourable for the defendant, if the judge doubts the defendant’s guilt, then it is logical for him to be inclined to the opposite, and that is the innocence. Until ‘recently’, however, and throughout most parts of Europe, the investigative judge was the one who lead the investigation, and, in search of material truth, he/she collected and presented evidence both against and in favour of the defendant. The evidence was then presented before the trial judge, who also searched for material truth and had the authority to propose evidence in order to reach for the truth. So, the judge who had the authority and obligation to present all possible evidence in order to reach for the truth, all of a sudden and “just” because of the doubt, had to decide in favour of the defendant. These two issues hardly go along. Not so much because of the obligation of the court to search for the truth (because the truth to a certain extent can be identified with the word certainty, i.e evidence that will eliminate any possibility of reasonable doubt), but because of the court’s authority to introduce evidence which will aim for that truth. The latter did not really entitle the judge to doubt, meaning it restricted the judge’s obligation to decide in favour of the defendant. If the judge would admit that he/she was in doubt, it would mean that he/ she did not search for the truth at the right place (and failed to present the right evidence). It is superfluous to mention the possible feeling of guilt of the judge for acquitting the alleged perpetrator only because the judge had (certain) doubt. As mentioned afore, staying in a state of doubt is unnatural, and a person will either incline on the opposite or will find the doubt unreasonable and will accept as the truth what they originally doubted. Perhaps a person will not accept it as the ultimate truth but will accept it as a greater truth than the other truth. So, since the judge was the seeker after the truth, he/she should decide where to search for it. 9