Article 1. Definition of Torture 67 covered by the wording of the second sentence in Article 1(1).266 Such an interpretation is in clear contradiction with general international human rights (and humanitarian) law as expressed, for instance, in the case law of the Human Rights Committee in relation to Article 7 CCPR which considers any form of corporal punishment as a violation of international law.267 Such interpretation would suggest that the CAT, which was adopted in 1984 with the clear object and purpose of strengthening the already existing State obligations to prevent and punish torture,268 in fact had lowered this international standard. Accordingly, such an interpretation is clearly incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention and can, therefore, not be upheld in light of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which outline that States ‘may not invoke provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty’.269 This provision by now forms part of customary international law.270 In addition, the savings clause in Article 1(2) prevents such an interpretation.271 266   This interpretation seems to be supported by Boulesbaa (n 30) 39 who concludes that the ‘exclusion of lawful sanctions therefore enables Parties to violate the Convention without being found in breach of it’. 267   The HRC has already in its General Comment 7 of 27 July 1982, para 2, expressed the unanimous opinion that the prohibition of Art. 7 CCPR ‘must extend to corporal punishment, including excessive chastisement as an educational or disciplinary measure’. See CCPR, ‘General Comment No 7: Article 7. Prohibition of Torture or Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ (1982). Since the landmark decision of Osbourne v Jamaica, No 759/​1997, UN Doc CCPR/​C/​68/​D/​759/​1997, 13 April 2000, para 9.1, in which the Committee unanimously confirmed its ‘firm opinion’ that ‘corporal punishment constitutes cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment contrary to article 7 of the Covenant’, this interpretation has developed into constant jurisprudence. See eg Higginson v Jamaica, No 792/​1998, UN Doc CCPR/​C/​74/​D/​792/​ 1998, 28 March 2002; Sooklal v Trinidad and Tobago, No 928/​2000, UN Doc CCPR/​C/​73/​D/​928/​2000, 25 October 2001; Errol Pryce v Jamaica, No 793/​1998, UN Doc CCPR/​C/​80/​D/​793/​1998, 13 May 2004; and cf Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (2nd rev edn, NP Engel 2005) 167ff. The ECtHR had already held in 1978 that birching of a juvenile as a traditional punishment on the Isle of Man was no longer compatible with a modern understanding of human rights: see Tyrer v UK, ECtHR (n 163). In the context of colonialism, both the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations had already in the late 1940s condemned corporal punishment in trust territories: see UNGA, Res 323(IV), 15 November 1949 and Rodley ‘The Treatment of Prisoners’ (n 98) 311ff. Similarly, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and both Additional Protocols of 1977 clearly prohibit any form of corporal punishment, either as a penal or as a disciplinary sanction, in international and non-​international armed conflicts: see Rodley ‘The Treatment of Prisoners’ (n 98) 316ff. Furthermore, r 31 of the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, which were adopted in 1955 by the First UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, and unanimously endorsed by ECOSOC in 1957 and the General Assembly in 1971, clearly prohibit corporal punishment as a sanction for disciplinary offences in prison. Also see UNGA, ‘United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners’, as revised by Res 70/​ 175 of 17 December 2015 (Mandela Rules). Finally, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture (Nigel Rodley), in his 1997 report to the Human Rights Commission, in unambiguous terms, expressed the view that ‘corporal punishment is inconsistent with the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ enshrined, inter alia, in the Universal Declaration, CCPR, and CAT. In this context, he also clearly rejected the argument that corporal punishment might be justified by the lawful sanctions clause: see SRT (Rodley) E/​CN.4/​1997/​7 (n 112) paras 4–​11. When the Government of Saudi Arabia challenged the mandate of the Special Rapporteur to take up the issue of corporal punishment, the Commission responded by adopting Res 1997/​38 which in para 9 ‘reminds Governments that corporal punishment can amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or even to torture’: see Rodley ‘The Treatment of Prisoners’ (n 98) 314. See also SRT (Nowak) ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ (2005) UN Doc A/​60/​316. SRT (Mendez) ‘Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ (2012) UN Doc A/​67/​279, para 27. 268   In the Preamble to the CAT, States parties expressed the desire ‘to make more effective the struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world’. See also Ingelse (n 90) 214. 269 270   arts 27 and 31 VCLT.   Also see AI, Combating Torture (n 135) 70. 271   See also below 3.4. Zach