32 United Nations Convention Against Torture and its Optional Protocol discrimination.28 They expressed concern that in certain aspects the definition of Article 1 of the draft Convention was rather loose and susceptible to subjective interpretation, highlighting in particular that it would be difficult for courts to assess the concept of mental suffering, particularly when linked to a motive such as discrimination. 28  Regarding situations where no physical or mental pain or suffering is apparent in the complainant, Barbados proposed that the Commission consider expanding the definition of torture to include the use of more sophisticated weapons such as ‘truth drugs’ where no physical or mental suffering is apparent in the complainant.29 29  The above conduct is prohibited when it ‘is intentionally inflicted on a person’. This seems to imply the exclusion of negligent conduct from the application of Article 1. However, no reference was made to the question as to when a particular conduct ceases to be considered purely negligent in the drafting history. The United States expressed dissatisfaction with this term, preferring ‘deliberate’ and ‘malicious’ over ‘intentional’. They proposed that Article 1(1) read ‘for the purposes of the present convention, the offence of torture includes any act by which extremely severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is deliberately and maliciously inflicted on a person by or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official’.30 The concept of acquiescence of a public official rather than ‘instigation by’ was proposed in order that it be made clear that the public official has a clear duty to act to prevent torture. No other State commented on this point and it elicited no serious discussion by the Working Group. The US proposal was not adopted. Neither was a UK proposal that the pain not only be intentionally, but also ‘systematically’ inflicted.31 It appears that the drafters of the present Convention considered the phrase ‘severe pain’ sufficient to convey the idea that only acts of a certain gravity be considered to constitute torture and that it was not considered necessary that the pain be inflicted systematically. It follows that even single, isolated acts can be considered to constitute torture. 30  The conduct must be carried out for the purpose of achieving a specific result. Article 1(1) contains a non-​exhaustive list of objectives, leaving room to qualify action as torture if it is applied with a different objective than that stated. Burgers and Danelius32 note that the words ‘such purposes as . . .’ mean that other objectives than those named must indeed have something in common with the objectives mentioned, ie the existence of some—​even remote—​connection with the interests or policies of the State and its organs. This is supported by the objective of the Convention as it appears in the travaux préparatoires and the preamble, ie the bringing to an end of torture by or under the responsibility of public authorities. 31  Regarding the purposes for which torture was used, while some States supported a reference to it in Article 1, others stated that it should be deleted as too restrictive.33 The legislative history indicates that the list of purposes is meant to be ‘indicative’ rather than ‘all-​inclusive’.34 The United Kingdom made the point that greater precision would have   Report of the Secretary-​General (1984) UN Doc A/​39/​499, para 19.   E/​CN.4/​1314/​Add.1 (n 22) para  24. 30   E/​CN.4/​1314 (n 8) para 27. See also Ahcene Boulesbaa, The UN Convention on Torture and the Prospects for Enforcement (Martinus Nijhoff 1999) 20. 31   E/​CN.4/​1314/​Add.1 (n  22). 32   Herman Burgers and Hans Danelius, The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Handbook on the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Martinus Nijhoff 1988) 119. 33   Report of the Informal Working Group to the Commission (1978) UN Doc E/​CN.4/​L.1400. 34   E/​CN.4/​1314/​Add.1 (n 22) para 2. See also Boulesbaa (n 30) 21. 28 29 Zach