Article 1. Definition of Torture 35 They argued that Article 7 extends the concept of torture to cover the offences of complicity, participation, incitement, and attempt, and that since these offences are committed by private citizens this article was inconsistent with Article 1 which limits the definition of torture to acts of public officials. In the same way they argued that Article 8, which deals with offences committed on board ships and aircraft, necessarily referred to acts of individuals and therefore should be redefined to apply to the offences in Articles 7 and 8 as well as other acts of private individuals.54 37  The draft IAPL Convention had also left room for the interpretation that it be applied to private individuals. Article II referred to acts ‘inflicted on a person by or at the instigation of a public official’. Article III of this draft referred to ‘a person’ (ie rather than a public official).55 Article III of the draft went on to illustrate the particular instances in which certain conduct would engender responsibility of a person for torture.56 38  In written comments on the IAPL draft Barbados suggested that the definition should be extended to cover acts of individual citizens in order to harmonize Article III which treats the offences of incitement, participation, attempt, and complicity as acts of torture. Morocco went on to point out that it was not always easy for a public official to have ‘reasonable belief ’ that torture had been committed by one of his subordinates and that it would also be difficult to prove that such a ‘senior public official’ had ‘reasonable belief ’ or even knowledge that torture had been committed since, as far as the police, for example, were concerned, an interrogation frequently took place in private between the police officer and the suspect or accused, without witnesses. Furthermore, the legal repercussions of the articles seemed to imply a ‘kind of immediate collective responsibility of public officials, whereas law always decreed the individuality of offences and therefore of penalties’. According to Morocco, Article II of the draft could give rise to a broad interpretation and lead to a general responsibility of officials, or even of the State, without even requiring that an investigation be carried out and before a decision on such responsibility is taken. Morocco went on to elaborate its views on State responsibility which it indicated could not be involved in such a situation because a crime involving torture committed by the officials of a State could not be attributed to that State except within the strict framework of the rules of international law governing State responsibility. None of the bilateral or multilateral international legal assistance agreements made such a ‘hasty judgement’ concerning State responsibility and it was therefore extremely desirable that the terms of the article be carefully amended. It should not, as it appeared to do, endorse a procedure which was as clearly contrary to legal practice as trials by hearsay; on the contrary it should insist that a preliminary legal investigation be carried out. It should also set out clearly the criteria for defining principal guilt and complicity, including (in view of the spirit of the Article) passive complicity. 39  During its thirty-​fifth session some States reiterated that the definition should not be limited to ‘public official’ and should apply to all individuals under the jurisdiction of a contracting State. It was said that such an approach was preferable because of the possible incidence of acts of torture committed by those other than public 55   E/​CN.4/​1314/​Add.4 (n 18) para  9.   E/​CN.4/​NGO/​213 (n 2) Arts 2 and 3.   According to Art III of the IAPL draft a person is responsible for acts of torture when that person: (a) personally engages in or participates in such conduct; or (b) assists, incites, solicits, commands, or conspires with others to commit torture; or (c) being a public official, fails to take appropriate measures to prevent or suppress torture when such person has knowledge or reasonable belief that torture has been or is being committed and has authority or is in a position to take such measures. 54 56 Zach