36 United Nations Convention Against Torture and its Optional Protocol officials. Others felt that such acts should be covered by existing or future national law, and that international action was primarily designed to cover situations where national action was otherwise least likely. In the end it was generally agreed that the definition of acts committed by public officials should be expanded to cover acts committed by, or at the instigation of, or with the acquiescence of a public official or any other person acting in an official capacity.57 This wording was adopted by the Working Group in 1980. 40  During General Assembly debates in 1984, Panama expressed dissatisfaction with the definition of torture, arguing that the language limited the definition and suggesting that it did not apply to acts of torture committed by individuals, civilian organizations, or pseudo religious sects.58 Panama and Spain felt that the prohibition should not have been limited to public officials alone since the purpose of the Convention is to eradicate any and all activities which result in torture. Spain preferred that the scope be wider and consistent with the General Assembly’s 1975 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from being subjected to Torture. 41  It is hard to say what sanctions are ‘inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions’ in a particular legal system. The Working Group did not provide any criteria on how to make this determination nor did it define the terms. Even if it had been able to do so this would have given rise to serious disputes amongst States parties due to the disparity of different legal systems. 42  The starting point was the 1978 Swedish draft which qualified its application as being consistent with the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (adopted by the General Assembly in the form of a recommendation and not as internationally binding legal obligations).59 There was considerable discussion at the Working Group’s thirty-​fourth session on this topic. The United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Spain, and the United States proposed the deletion of this reference to the rules as they felt that their inclusion would grant the rules the character of a legally binding instrument.60 43  In written comments the United Kingdom noted in particular that it was apparent from the last sentence of paragraph 1 of the original Swedish draft that the Convention would accept the Standard Minimum Rules as a standard and that therefore the last sentence should be deleted.61 The Federal Republic of Germany also preferred to omit the reference, arguing that the Standard Minimum Rules were ‘lower ranking regulations which could be altered by non-​legislative means and that could therefore directly modify the contents of the convention’.62 The German Democratic Republic recalled that the reference had not been common practice with the United Nations in the past and that such a reference would make the Standard Minimum Rules ‘an essential criterion in a binding international instrument, thereby depriving them of their recommendatory nature’. The Spanish delegation noted that they sought the deletion of the reference as it was ‘not only unnecessary (bearing in mind the concept being described) but also because the   E/​CN.4/​L.1470 (n 7) 4, § 17.   Report of the Secretary General (1984) UN Doc A/​39/​499/​Add.1, para 14. 59   ECOSOC, ‘Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners’ of 30 August 1955, on 31 July 1957, arts 31–​34. 60   Report of the Commission on Human Rights on its thirty-​fourth Session (1978) UN Doc E/​CN.4/​ 1292, para 31. 61 62   E/​CN.4/​1314/​Add.1 (n  22).   E/​CN.4/​1314/​Add.2  (n  9). 57 58 Zach