warrant amounted to a violation of the right to private life under the ICCPR.354 Concerning personal and body searches, the Committee has held that “effective measures should ensure that such searches are carried out in a manner consistent with the dignity of the person who is being searched”.355 On stop and search powers of the police, the ECtHR has considered that the use of coercive powers “to require an individual to submit to a detailed search of his person, his clothing and his personal belongings amounts to a clear interference with the right to respect for private life”, and that the public nature of a search may “compound the seriousness of the interference because of an element of humiliation and embarrassment.”356 Such interference is justified only if it is “in accordance with the law”, pursues a legitimate aim and is “necessary in a democratic society” in order to achieve that aim.357 247. T he Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights has recalled the threats that the Internet can pose for human rights defenders “when repressive governments use information available on the Internet and social networking sites to identify networks of human rights defenders and other activists and persecute them.”358 Indeed, the challenges arising from digital information and communication technologies are an issue of increasing international concern. In its 2013 Resolution on the right to privacy in the digital age, the UNGA drew attention to the fact “that the rapid pace of technological development enables individuals all over the world to use new information and communication technologies and at the same time 354  Darmon Sultanova v. Uzbekistan, Communication No. 915/2000, adopted on 30 March 2006, para. 7.9. In its jurisprudence, the European Court of Human Rights has also emphasized that legislation and practice concerning house searches and seizures in order to obtain physical evidence must afford adequate and effective safeguards against abuse (see Miailhe v. France, Application no. 12661/87, 25 February 1993, paras. 37-39). As regards the interpretation of the words “private life” and “home”, the Court also held that a search of an individual’s office can constitute an interference with the rights under Article 8 of the Convention (see Niemietz v. Germany, Application no. 13710/88, 16 December 1992, paras. 27-33). In another case, it also held that this may apply to legal persons, such as a search of a company’s registered office, branches or other business premises (see Société Colas Est and Others v. France, Application no. 37971/97, 16 April 2002). 355  See General Comment No. 16, para. 8. Concerning body searches in the context of travelling across borders see also the section on Freedom of Movement and human rights work within and across borders. 356  “Items such as bags, wallets, notebooks and diaries may, moreover, contain personal information which the owner may feel uncomfortable about having exposed to the view of his companions or the wider public.” See Gillan and Quinton v. United Kingdom, Application no. 4158/05, 12 January 2010, para. 63. 357  Ibid. para. 65. In the case in question the Court found a violation of Article 8 since the powers of authorization and confirmation as well as those of stop and search under the applicable law were neither sufficiently circumscribed nor subject to adequate legal safeguards against abuse (para. 87). The Court was of the view that, due to the broad discretion granted to police officers, there was a clear risk of arbitrariness, and furthermore, “a risk that such a widely framed power could be misused against demonstrators and protestors in breach of Article 10 and/or 11 of the Convention” (para. 85). 358  See “4th Quarterly Activity Report 2013 by Nils Muižnieks, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, 1 October to 31 December 2013”, CommDH(2014)3, 12 February 2014, p. 20. More specifically, the Commissioner reported, for example, that during his visit to Azerbaijan he “received information from various interlocutors that security agencies were monitoring online activities or tracking user data in Azerbaijan. In particular, some of the Commissioner’s interlocutors reported that the authorities had referred to their Facebook activities or had shown them their private mailbox during interrogations.” See “Report by Nils Muižnieks, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Following his visit to Azerbaijan from 22 to 24 May 2013”, CommDH(2013)14, 6 August 2013, paras. 40 and 41. Guidelines on the Protection of Human Rights Defenders 113