tleblowers, for example, cannot be assured that their communications are not subject to state scrutiny. Without strong protections they risk being subjected to arbitrary surveillance activities.363 In a case arising from the complaint that legislation had given the authorities wide discretion to gather and use information obtained through secret surveillance, the ECtHR recalled the minimum safeguards that should be set out in statute law to avoid abuses, including: “the nature of the offences which may give rise to an interception order; a definition of the categories of people liable to have their communications monitored; a limit on the duration of such monitoring; the procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained; the precautions to be taken when communicating the data to other parties; and the circumstances in which data obtained may or must be erased or the records destroyed.”364 Furthermore, the Court reiterated that there must be “adequate and effective guarantees against abuse” in the context of covert surveillance measures, including in relation to “the nature, scope and duration of the possible measures, the grounds required for ordering them, the authorities competent to permit, carry out and supervise them, and the kind of remedy provided by the national law”.365 249. In a case concerning a member of a human rights organization who had been reg- istered in a “Surveillance Database”, the ECtHR found a violation of the right to privacy under the ECHR.366 The database in question collected information about the applicant’s movements within the country, which – as the Court pointed out – amounted to an interference with his private life. Since the creation and maintenance of the database was governed by a ministerial order that was not published 363  A/HRC/23/40, paras. 79 and 51. In general, as the Human Rights Committee pointed out, “[s]urveillance, whether electronic or otherwise, interceptions of telephonic, telegraphic and other forms of communication, wire-tapping and recording of conversations should be prohibited.” See General Comment No. 16, para. 8. The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression stressed that “[l]egislation must stipulate that State surveillance of communications must only occur under the most exceptional circumstances and exclusively under the supervision of an independent judicial authority.” See A/HRC/23/40, para. 81. 364  See Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria, Application no. 62540/00, 28 June 2007, paras. 76. 365  Ibid. para. 77. See also Liberty v. UK, Application no. 58243/00, 1 July 2008, in which the Court found the state to be in violation of Article 8 of the ECHR because it did not consider that “the domestic law at the relevant time indicated with sufficient clarity, so as to provide adequate protection against abuse of power, the scope or manner of exercise of the very wide discretion conferred on the State to intercept and examine external communications. In particular, it did not, as required by the Court’s case-law, set out in a form accessible to the public any indication of the procedure to be followed for selecting for examination, sharing, storing and destroying intercepted material” (para. 69). In the view of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, anyone should also have a legal right to be notified when they have been subjected to communications surveillance or their communications data has been accessed by the state. The Special Rapporteur recognizes, however, that advance or concurrent notification might jeopardize the effectiveness of the surveillance. Nevertheless he stressed that individuals should be notified once the surveillance has been completed so as to ensure that they can seek redress with respect to the use of communications surveillance measures in their aftermath (see A/HRC/23/40 para. 82). Concerning the widespread practice of telephone tapping in Bulgaria, the Human Rights Committee recommended the state party to ensure that those who were wrongfully monitored are systematically informed thereof and have access to adequate remedies. See “Concluding Observations on Bulgaria”, UN Doc. CCPR/C/BGR/CO/3, para. 22. 366  See Shimovolos v. Russia, Application no. 30194/09, 21 June 2011. Guidelines on the Protection of Human Rights Defenders 115