CAT/C/60/D/662/2015 individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies. The Committee notes that, in the present case, the State party concedes that the complainant has exhausted all available domestic remedies. Consideration of the merits 7.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties concerned, in accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention. 7.2 The issue before the Committee is whether the return of the complainant to the Islamic Republic of Iran would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 (1) of the Convention not to expel or return (“refouler”) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would risk being subjected to torture. 7.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to the Islamic Republic of Iran. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. The Committee recalls that the aim of that determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would personally be at a foreseeable and real risk of being tortured in the country to which he or she would return. It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute a sufficient ground for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his or her return to that country. Additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would personally be at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture given his or her specific circumstances. 34 7.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1, wherein it states that the existence of a risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. Although the risk does not have to be shown to be highly probable, 35 the Committee recalls that the burden of proof normally falls on the complainant, who must present an arguable case establishing that he or she runs a foreseeable, real and personal risk.36 The Committee further recalls that, in accordance with its general comment No. 1, it gives considerable weight to findings of fact that are made by the organs of the State party concerned, but, at the same time, it is not bound by such findings, and instead has the power, under article 22 (4) of the Convention, of free assessment of the facts based on the full set of circumstances in each case.37 7.5 The complainant claims that, in the Islamic Republic of Iran, he could be persecuted or subjected to torture because of his conversion to Christianity and his political activities in Switzerland. He was not politically active in his home country, but nonetheless contends that political considerations were one of the reasons why he left the Islamic Republic of Iran (his father worked for the Shah’s regime and is not allowed to leave Iranian territory, and, after the revolution, his family home was confiscated by the secret police). He adds that even people who are no more than sympathizers of the opposition are likely to be arrested arbitrarily and mistreated in prison. The Committee notes that the complainant claims to have had trouble with the secret police in 1991, before leaving the Islamic 34 35 36 37 10 See, for example, communication No. 490/2012, E.K.W. v. Finland, decision adopted on 4 May 2015, para. 9.3. General comment No. 1, para. 6. Ibid. See also communications Nos. 203/2002, A.R. v. Netherlands, decision adopted on 14 November 2003, para. 7.3; 343/2008, Kalonzo v. Canada, decision adopted on 18 May 2012, para. 9.3; 458/2011, X v. Denmark, decision adopted on 28 November 2014, para. 9.3; and 520/2012, W.G.D. v. Canada, decision adopted on 26 November 2014, para. 8.4. See general comment No. 1, para. 9; and communications Nos. 375/2009, T.D. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 26 May 2011, para. 8.7; and 466/2011, Alp v. Denmark, decision adopted on 14 May 2014, para. 8.3. GE.17-12101