CAT/C/63/D/621/2014 established that the application of those remedies has been unreasonably prolonged or is unlikely to bring effective relief to the alleged victim. 10 6.3 The Committee takes note of the State party’s argument that the complaint should be declared inadmissible under article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention on the grounds that the complainant has failed to exhaust all available domestic remedies, as he failed to pursue an application for judicial review of the negative Refugee Protection Division and pre-removal risk assessment decisions, along with which a stay of removal can be requested, and he failed to make an application for permanent residence on the basis of humanitarian and compassionate grounds. 6.4 The Committee recalls its jurisprudence that the humanitarian and compassionate application is not an effective remedy for the purposes of admissibility pursuant to article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention, given its discretionary and non-judicial nature and the fact that it does not stay the removal of a complainant. 11 Accordingly, the Committee does not consider it necessary for the complainant to exhaust the application for permanent residence on the basis of humanitarian and compassionate grounds for the purpose of admissibility. 12 6.5 Concerning the complainant’s failure to apply for leave to seek a judicial review of the Refugee Protection Division and pre-removal risk assessment decisions, the Committee notes the State party’s argument that judicial review in such cases assesses, inter alia, whether a factual error has been made, that such review is effective and substantive and that, in practice, cases are sent back for reconsideration on this basis. 13 The State party further asserts: that the complainant’s allegations are incompatible with the provisions of the Convention, as the mistreatment he claims to have suffered does not amount to torture; that the acts in question were not carried out by the State authorities or with their acquiescence, as required by the definition of torture in article 1 of the Convention; and that the complainant has failed to substantiate on even a prima facie basis his claims that he would face a personal risk of being subjected to torture if returned to Nigeria. 6.6 The Committee notes the complainant’s assertion that he did not apply for any of the above remedies as, in any case, such remedies are ineffective and unlikely to bring effective relief, and therefore the communication should be found to be admissible in accordance with article 22 (5) (b). He also claims that the evidence provided clearly demonstrates a personal risk and that his claim has therefore been substantiated and is admissible. 6.7 The Committee recalls its jurisprudence that judicial review in the State party is not a mere formality, and that the Federal Court may, in appropriate cases, look at the substance of a case.14 Mere doubt about the effectiveness of a remedy does not, in its view, dispense with the obligation to exhaust it. The Committee concludes that the complainant has failed to advance sufficient elements that would show that judicial review of the negative Refugee Protection Division and pre-removal risk assessment decisions and judicial stay of removal would have been ineffective in the present case, and has not justified his failure to avail himself of these remedies. 6.8 Accordingly, the Committee is satisfied with the argument of the State party that, in the particular circumstances of the present case, there were remedies, both available and effective, which the complainant has not exhausted. 15 In the light of this finding, the Committee does not deem it necessary to examine the State party’s assertion that the 10 11 12 13 14 15 6 See, inter alia, E.Y. v. Canada (CAT/C/43/D/307/2006/Rev.1), para. 9.2. See also Committee against Torture, general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 in the context of article 22. See, e.g., J.S. v. Canada (CAT/C/62/D/695/2015), para. 6.3; J.M. v. Canada (CAT/C/60/D/699/2015), para. 6.2; A v. Canada (CAT/C/57/D/583/2014), para. 6.2; and W.G.D. v. Canada (CAT/C/53/D/520/2012), para. 7.4. See, e.g., S.S. v. Canada (CAT/C/62/D/715/2015), para. 6.3. According to sect. 18.1 (4) of the Federal Courts Act, Federal Court judicial review of pre-removal risk assessment decisions is not limited to errors of law and mere procedural flaws, and the Court may look at the substance of a case. See, e.g., Aung v. Canada (CAT/C/36/D/273/2005/Rev.1), para. 6.3; and S.S. and P.S. v. Canada (CAT/C/62/D/702/2015), para. 6.5. See, e.g., J.S. v. Canada, para. 6.6; and S.S. and P.S. v. Canada, para. 6.6.