CEDAW/C/60/D/51/2013 4.7 The State party considers that guidance can be found in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which has applied 4 extraterritorial effect in relation to article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights), a peremptory norm relating to torture and non-refoulement, but has declined to apply the extraterritorial effect of the European Convention on Human Rights in cases under other provisions of that instrument, arguing that, on a purely pragmatic basis, it cannot be required that an expelling State return an alien only to a co untry that is in full compliance with and fully and effectively enforcing all human rights. The State party further refers to the jurisprudence of the Committee and the Human Rights Committee and submits that the latter has never considered a complaint on its merits regarding the deportation of a person who feared a violation of a “lesser” right or a derogable right by the receiving State. The State party also specifically refers to the relevant provisions of the Convention against Torture and articles 6 an d 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, stating that those provisions have been interpreted as offering implicit protection against removal to the death penalty and to torture or other similarly serious threats to the life and secu rity of the person, while specifying that it does not consider that the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women deals directly (or indirectly) with removal to torture or other serious threats to the life and security of the person. 4.8 The State party submits that it is aware that the Committee has emphasized in its general recommendation No. 19 that gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that can impair or nullify the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as the right to life, the right to security of the person and the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Nevertheless, it considers that that does not change the fact that a State party is responsible only for obligations vis-à-vis individuals under its jurisdiction and cannot be held responsible for discrimination under the jurisdiction of another State, even if the author can establish that she would be subjected to discrimination contrary to the Convention owing to gender-based violence in China. The State party refers to two recent decisions of the Committee in which this particular challenge to admissibility was not considered, 5 both decisions being declared inadmissible for other reasons. The State party therefore agrees with the author that it would be preferable if the Committee were to express its opinion on the issue of the extraterritoriality of the Convention. The State party notes, however, that the returning of women who arrive in Denmark simply to escape from discriminatory treatment in their own country, however objectionable that treatment may seem, cannot constitute a violation of the Convention by Denmark. The State party contends that, were the opposite view accepted, the consequences would be that States parties could return aliens only to countries where the conditions were in full and effective accord with each of the safeguards of the rights set out in the Convention, a position that it deems to be unacceptable. __________________ 4 5 15-05832 The State party refers to the judgement of 7 July 1989 of the European Court of Human Rights in Soering v. the United Kingdom (application No. 14038/88). The State party refers to communication No. 25/2010, M.P.M. v. Canada, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 24 February 2012, and communication No. 26/2010, Herrera Rivera v. Canada, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 18 October 2011. 7/15