OSCE/ODIHR Opinion on the Draft Act on the Independent National Human Rights Institution of Iceland the protection and promotion of human rights in Iceland at a later stage. However, any new legislation in this area should seek to ensure the coherence and effectiveness of this institutional framework – in particular vis-à-vis the public (see also comments on complaints-handling in Sub-Section 3.2 infra). Before creating the NHRI, it would be advisable for the legal drafters to carry out a comprehensive review of the existing framework pertaining to the protection and promotion of human rights in Iceland, including with respect to anti-discrimination and gender equality, children’ rights, maladministration, and human rights protection in general; should there be any plans to ratify the OPCAT, then the designation of an NPM should also be part of this discussion. Moreover, before adopting any new legislation, it is crucial that policymakers and other stakeholders carry out a full impact assessment of the draft legislation, which should involve a consideration of all financial and human costs for the new entity to fulfil its mandate (see also Sub-Section 6.2 infra). 2.2. The Independence of the NHRI from Other State Institutions/Bodies 25. Article 2 of the Draft Act emphasises that the NHRI shall operate independently from the instructions of other parties, including the Althingi (the Parliament). The Draft Act could be supplemented by adding that the NHRI will base its strategic priorities and activities solely on its determination of the human rights priorities in the country, in co-operation with diverse societal groups as appropriate (see General Observation 1.7). 26. At the same time, Article 2 further provides that “the Presidium of the Althing [may] require reports on any specific matters falling under the remit of the Institution”. This provision could raise concerns if this right of the Presidium would prevent the NHRI from carrying out its mandate according to its own choices and set priorities without interference. 27. Paris Principle C (a) states that an NHRI must be able to “freely consider any question falling within its competence […] on the proposal of its members or of any petitioner”. By clearly promoting independence in the NHRI’s method of operation, this provision seeks to avoid any possible interference in the institution’s assessment of the human rights situation in a given state and the subsequent determination of its strategic priorities.25 This means that members of parliament, and a fortiori the Parliament’s Presidium, should not be in a position to influence the work and operation of the NHRI.26 This is important to ensure that this body is fully independent in its decisionmaking and its operation, and to avoid potential conflicts of interest. At the same time, such independence is without prejudice to the importance of effective co-operation between NHRIs and Parliament.27 The legal drafters should reconsider the provision regarding potential requests by the Presidium of the Althingi. 25 26 27 See Justification to General Observation 1.9. See General Observation 1.9. See the 2012 Belgrade Principles on the Relationship between National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) and Parliaments, developed during a Seminar co-organized by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights, the National Assembly and the Protector of Citizens of the Republic of Serbia, with the support of the United Nations Country Team in the Republic of Serbia, available at http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/Themes/Portuguese/DocumentsPage/Belgrade%20Principles%20Final.pdf. 10