OSCE/ODIHR Opinion on the Draft Act on the Independent National Human Rights Institution of Iceland Board should also be representative of the Icelandic society’s social, ethnic, religious and geographic diversity, and should reflect diverse segments of Icelandic society, professions, and backgrounds. This helps promote public confidence in the institution and ensures that the NHRI has relevant experience and insights as to the needs of those sectors of society.52 Guarantees for ensuring such pluralism should be also included in the Draft Act.53 47. First, advertising vacancies broadly maximizes the potential number of candidates, thereby promoting pluralism.54 It is therefore recommended to specify in the Draft Act that the vacancies for members of the Board of Directors shall be publicized broadly. Other tools to ensure such pluralism in the composition of NHRIs could be to provide for the establishment of an independent selection committee whose composition should reflect diverse societal groups.55 Such groups (e.g., non-governmental organizations, universities, trade unions, concerned social and professional organizations) could also be invited to suggest or recommend candidates.56 In any case, the rules and procedures should promote broad consultation and/or participation of these diverse societal groups throughout the application, screening, selection and appointment process.57 The legal drafters may consider introducing such modalities to promote pluralism in the NHRI decision-making body. To ensure an inclusive process, the legal drafters should also consult with various stakeholders, including civil society, when determining the most appropriate criteria and procedures for that purpose.58 48. Generally, the selection by the Parliament of the members of the Board of Directors of the Institution for five years i.e., which exceeds the parliamentary term of four years (Article 31 of the Constitution), is a good solution. At the same time, the Draft Act is not clear as to whether such a term is renewable or not. Usually, the Sub-Committee on Accreditation advocates for a term of three to seven years, which may be renewed once.59 At the same time, if there is no possibility of renewal, this could also enhance the institutional independence, as members would not be affected by potential future reappointment.60 In any case, for the sake of clarity of the legislation, the legislator should specify whether the term of office of the members of the Board of Directors should be renewable or not. 49. Further, the Draft Act does not specify the parliamentary majority required for such appointments. Due to the independent nature of an NHRI, also representatives of the opposition should have a real say in the appointment of members of the Board of Directors, so as to ensure that there is the broadest possible consensus on the persons 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 See Justification to General Observation 1.7. See also e.g., OSCE/ODIHR, Opinion on the Draft Amendments to the Law on Civil Service of Ukraine, 10 May 2016, par 42, available at http://www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/6196/file/289_NHRI_UKR_10May2016_en.pdf. See also Amnesty International, National Human Rights Institutions: Amnesty International’ Recommendations for Effective Protection and Promotion of Human Rights (2001), page 10, Recommendation 2.4, available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior40/007/2001/en/. See OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission, Joint Opinion on the Law No. 2008-37 of 16 June 2008 relating to the Higher Committee for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Republic of Tunisia, 17 June 2013, par 44, available at http://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/17976. See Justification to General Observation 1.8. See op. cit. footnote 14, page 248 (2010 UNDP-OHCHR Toolkit for Collaboration with National Human Rights Institutions). See General Observation 1.7. See also ibid. page 248 (2010 UNDP-OHCHR Toolkit for Collaboration with National Human Rights Institutions). See General Observation 1.8. See Justification to General Observation 1.7. See General Observation 2.2. See op. cit. footnote 53, par 43 (2013 OSCE/ODIHR-Venice Commission Joint Opinion on the Law relating to the Higher Committee for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Tunisia). 16