CAT/C/22/D/120/1998 page 9 view is supported by the report of its embassy in Nairobi, which states that “(a)ll Somalis in Somalia are vulnerable because of lack of a functioning central government authority and an effective rule of law. [The author’s] situation, were he to return to Somalia, would not be exceptional”. 4.21 In the event that the Committee disagrees with the State party’s assessment that the risk faced by the author is not a real, foreseeable and personal one, the State party contends that such risk is not a risk of “torture” as defined in article 1 of the Convention. Although the State party accepts that the political situation in Somalia makes it possible that the author may face violations of his human rights, it argues that such violations will not necessarily involve the kind of acts contemplated in article 1 of the Convention. For example, even though the acts of extortion anticipated by the author may be committed for one of the purposes referred to in the definition of torture, such acts would not necessarily entail the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering. In addition, the author’s claims that he will risk detention, torture and possibly execution have not been sufficiently substantiated. 4.22 Finally, the State party reiterates its reasoning as to the admissibility of the case and also as to the merits. Counsel's comments 5.1 As regards the ratione materiae admissibility of the communication, counsel submits that despite the lack of a central government, certain armed clans in effective control of territories within Somalia are covered by the terms “public official” or “other person acting in an official capacity” as required by article 1 of the Convention. In fact, the absence of a central government in a State increases the likelihood that other entities will exercise quasi-governmental powers. 5.2 Counsel further emphasizes that the reason for limiting the definition of torture to the acts of public officials or other persons acting in an official capacity was that the purpose of the Convention was to provide protection against acts committed on behalf of, or at least tolerated by, the public authorities, whereas the State would normally be expected to take action, in accordance with its criminal law, against private persons having committed acts of torture against other persons. Therefore, the assumption underlying this limitation was that, in all other cases, States were under the obligation by customary international law to punish acts of torture by “non-public officials”. It is consistent with the above that the Committee stated, in G.R.B. v. Sweden, that “whether the State party has an obligation to refrain from expelling a person who might risk pain or suffering inflicted by a non-governmental entity, without the consent or acquiescence of the Government, falls outside the scope of article 3 of the Convention”. However, the present case is distinguishable from the latter as it concerns return to a territory where non-governmental entities themselves are in effective control in the absence of a central government, from which protection cannot be sought. 5.3 Counsel submits that when the Convention was drafted there was agreement by all States to extend the scope of the perpetrator of the act from the