A/73/207 compliance with the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment by the receiving State (A/HRC/37/50, paras. 47–50). (d) Intelligence exchanges 57. Intelligence exchanges, particularly in the context of counter-terrorism, continue to undermine the prohibition. In many States, the use of information by intelligence services that may have been obtained by torture or ill -treatment in other countries is still not prohibited or has even been publicly condoned. Such intelligence exchanges have created a “market” for information obtained through torture and illtreatment (A/HRC/25/60, paras. 37–38) and, in many cases, may well involve complicity in the perpetration of such abuse. Just as is the case for judicial and administrative proceedings, the gathering and exchange of intelligence are conducted to establish the basis for potentially significant decisions by State authorities and, therefore, trigger due diligence obligations with regard to the prevention of t orture and ill-treatment (A/HRC/10/3, paras. 55–57). In the view of the Special Rapporteur, any good faith interpretation of the exclusionary rule in line with its object and purpose necessarily must entail its applicability not only to judicial and administrative proceedings, but also to intelligence and executive decisions of any kind (A/HRC/16/52, para. 56). 2. Individual accountability 58. The prohibition of torture and ill-treatment cannot be effectively implemented without individual accountability. Reliable investigation and prosecution mechanisms not only ensure sanctions and redress, but also have a deterrent effect against the occurrence of violations in the first place. In practice, however, the overwhelming majority of perpetrators are never held legally to account and, of those who are, few receive sanctions commensurate with the gravity of their crimes. Widespread failure to hold perpetrators, whether State officials or non-State actors, accountable creates a persistent environment of impunity conducive to torture and ill -treatment. Such shortcomings are often compounded by formal obstacles to individual accountability in national law, such as the application of statutes of limitation, blanket amnesties, immunities and other jurisdictional impediments. The Special Rapporteur is of the view that such obstacles are not compatible with the duty of States to ensure the effective prevention of torture and ill-treatment, the investigation of violations, the punishment of perpetrators and the provision of the required redress, reparation and rehabilitation for victims of such abuse. 3. Non-State actors 59. States often do not sufficiently protect individuals and populations against violence and abuse at the hands of non-State actors, such as organized armed groups, militias and criminal networks, but also corporate actors and private individuals. Where committed for reasons related to an armed conflict, or at the instigation or with the consent or acquiescence of State officials, such violence and abuse generally amount to torture and ill-treatment. Irrespective of the precise circumstances, however, States are legally obliged to take all reasonable measures to protect any individual or group within their jurisdiction exposed to violence and abuse, including gender-based, ethnic or any other discriminatory violence, harmful practices such as female genital mutilation and domestic violence and trafficking in human beings, especially of women and children. This can also entail a duty to retract or revise official policies which, deliberately or inadvertently, create an environment conducive to violence and abuse on the part of non-State actors, such as “tough” policies on irregular migration and petty crime, or complacency regarding domestic, xenophobic or homophobic violence ( A/HRC/31/57 and A/HRC/37/50, paras. 30–37). 16/23 18-12051