tation in police station 16, the Commission of the Länder noticed that the detention record contains only general information on the individuals in custody. Special incidents are not noted in it, but according to the officials were explained in the reports on the individual incidents. The request of the Commission of the Länder to inspect the station’s reports was not complied with. The Commission of the Länder was notified that the documents in question were part of the investigation file that was now with the public prosecution office. In this respect, a request for inspection of the files would have to be lodged with the public prosecution office. In accordance with Article 20 para. b of the Optional Protocol, the Commission of the Länder is to be given access to all information referring to the treatment of those persons as well as their conditions of detention. This includes all parts of files documenting the reason for and the implementation of detention, even if they are simultaneously part of the investigation file. The keeping of the files in the police stations evidently also serves to verify the treatment of the detained persons for the benefit of the police. If this is so, the files are also subject to inspection by the Commission. Checking on individuals in custody by opening the cell door should always be carried out by two officers, and should be documented in the detention record by name and signature. The officers were also armed in the detention area. This is in line with the PDV 350 official police regulation. The Commission however finds the arming of the detention area to be problematic, and it asks for a statement as to why this aspect is regulated in this manner. 73 in 2010, the Land authorities, including the Hamburg Police, had issued instructions regarding the inspection of apprehension documents by the CPT to the police stations which contained restrictions referring to the competence of the public prosecution office for the proceedings and the protection of patient data. The CPT is said to have criticised these as too strict and practically unsuitable for effective inspections. Since the Interior Department is said to be responsible neither in terms of judicial restrictions nor of those under data protection law or their abolition, reference was made to the competent authorities in this regard. It was suggested here that the justice departments come to a clear, final arrangement in order to avoid corresponding delays, criticism and enquiries in future, and to enable staff to work effectively. The provisions for personal security recommend entering detention cells as a matter of principle with no firearm and only in pairs. The PDV 350 (HH) official police regulation however foregoes these corresponding instructions, so that such latitude is said to be available (cf. also information below). PDV 350 (HH) is said to prescribe in general terms the carrying of official weapons, but deviations are permitted with an appropriate regulatory situation for reasons of individual tactics, welfare or other official reasons. On the topic of personal security in “taking into custody”, PDV 350 (HH) is said to forego instructions and limit itself to the control of detained persons “at least half-hourly by