CCPR/C/127/D/3070/2017 of admissibility. Accordingly, it declares that part of the communication inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.35 8.5 The Committee notes the State party’s challenge to admissibility on the grounds that the author’s claim under articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant is unsubstantiated. However, the Committee considers that, for the purposes of admissibility, the author has provided sufficient information in support of the claim that his forcible return to Afghanistan would result in a risk of treatment contrary to articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. Therefore, the Committee declares the communication admissible, insofar as it raises issues under articles 6 and 7, and proceeds to its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 9.1 The Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all the information submitted by the parties, in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 9.2 The Committee notes the author’s claim that returning him to Afghanistan would expose him to a real risk of irreparable harm, in violation of articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. He alleged that, if returned to Afghanistan, he would face potentially life threatening persecution due to his particular vulnerability related to his apostasy, which has been publicized through social media, his deteriorating mental and physical condition, which includes suicidal ideation, his belonging to the Hazara ethnic minority group and his lack of knowledge of Afghanistan and its language, circumstances that are aggravated by the fact that he has no family or network in Afghanistan, where the security situation has seriously deteriorated. 9.3 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, in which it referred to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory when there were substantial grounds for believing that there was a real risk of irreparable harm such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. 36 The Committee has also indicated that the risk must be personal 37 and that there is a high threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists. 38 All relevant facts and circumstances must be considered, including the general human rights situation in the author’s country of origin.39 The Committee recalls that it is generally for the organs of States parties to examine the facts and evidence of the case in question in order to determine whether such a risk exists, 40 unless it can be established that the assessment was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice. 41 9.4 In the present case, the Committee notes that, in its decision rendered in August 2017, the Migration Board found that the author had failed to substantiate his claim that he would be at risk of persecution by the Afghan authorities and rejected his claim of atheism as constituting new circumstances to impede the enforcement of the expulsion order. The Committee also notes that the Migration Court considered the author’s claim of his fear of persecution as an atheist but found that he had failed to substantiate that his convictions as an atheist were genuine, despite the existence of letters of support, emphasizing that the author could not explain sufficiently why he had not submitted that claim at an earlier stage of the asylum application process. In that connection, the Committee notes the author’s view that the assessment of his claim regarding his atheism was unfair and arbitrary, given 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 12 The Committee also notes that the author did not maintain his claim with regard to article 18 and conceded the State party’s claim of inadmissibility ratione materiae. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, para. 12. K v. Denmark (CCPR/C/114/D/2393/2014), para. 7.3; P.T. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/113/D/2272/2013), para. 7.2; and X v. Denmark (CCPR/C/110/D/2007/2010), para. 9.2. X v. Sweden, para. 5.18. Ibid. See also X v. Denmark, para. 9.2. Pillai et al. v. Canada (CCPR/C/101/D/1763/2008), para. 11.4; and Z.H. v. Australia (CCPR/C/107/D/1957/2010), para. 9.3. For example, K v. Denmark, para. 7.4.