A/67/396 the International Commission of Jurists. 5 Referring to the “virtually uniform criticism of the system as it presently operates”, the Panel agreed with the Council of the Europe Parliamentary Assembly that the sanctions regime “violates the fundamental principles of human rights and the rule of law” and was therefore “unworthy” of an international institution. 6 15. The root of the problem lies in a conflict of international legal norms. Since the Security Council is a political organ, 7 its traditional decision-making structures lack the procedural mechanisms necessary to protect the due process rights of the individual. These rights are enshrined in international human rights treaties, and are broadly reflected in national and regional legal systems. Some “core” due process rights are today recognized as rules of customary international law, including the fundamental axiom nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa (no one may be a judge in his own cause). 8 16. Under the Al-Qaida regime, the Council, through its Sanctions Committee, is responsible for designating individuals and entities on the Consolidated List and for adjudicating upon applications for their removal. This is inconsistent with any reasonable conception of due process, and gives the appearance that the Council is acting above and beyond the law. However, some members of the Council are unwilling to cede their Chapter VII powers to any form of binding review by an independent body. Indeed, some argue that this would be contrary to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations itself, and therefore would be ultra vires. 17. The Special Rapporteur does not share this analysis. While the Security Council is primarily a political body, rather than a legal one, it exercises both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions in the present context. 9 Under Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter, States are required to comply with binding decisions of the Council adopted under Chapter VII, even where this would entail violating their obligations under another international treaty. 10 Given the __________________ 5 6 7 8 9 10 6 See International Commission of Jurists, Assessing Damage, Urging Action: Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights (Geneva, International Commission of Jurists, 2009). Ibid., pp. 116-117. See Hans Kelsen, “Collective Security and Collective Self-Defence under the Charter of the United Nations”, 42 American Journal of International Law, 783 (1948). See CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994), para. 8; Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law, pp. 96-97 (Clarendon, 1989); International Bar Association, International Terrorism: Legal Challenges and Responses: A Report by the International Bar Association Task Force on Terrorism, p. 71 (2004); Luis Condorelli, “Conclusions”, in Les évolutions de la protection juridictionnelle des fonctionnaires internationaux et européens — développements récents, G. M. Palmieri, ed., p. 359 (Brussels, 2012); Security Council CrossCutting Report. See Jeremy Matam Farrall, United Nations sanctions and the rule of law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007); Jose Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (New York, Oxford University Press, 2005). See International Court of Justice, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom, ICJ Reports, vol. 1, p. 16, para. 42, and p. 113, para. 39 (1992); International Court of Justice, Nicaragua v. United States of America, ICJ Reports, p. 392, para. 107 (1984); Her Majesty’s Treasury (Respondent) v. Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others (FC) (Appellants) [2010] UKSC 2, [2010] 2 AC 534, para. 11. 12-52254