CCPR/C/123/D/2575/2015 9.3 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 31, in which it refers to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated in article 7 of the Covenant. The Committee has also indicated that the risk must be personal and that the threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists is high. 26 The Committee further recalls its jurisprudence that considerable weight should be given to the assessment conducted by the State party and that it is generally for the organs of States parties to the Covenant to review and evaluate facts and evidence in order to determine whether such a risk exists,27 unless it is found that the evaluation was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice.28 9.4 The Committee notes the author’s allegation that Italy granted her subsidiary protection in 2009, including a residence permit valid for three years, following which she was asked to leave the asylum centre; that she was denied access to medical examination in Italy although she was pregnant (see para. 2.5 above); and that despite having allegedly sought assistance from the local authorities, she did not receive any social or housing support and was left without shelter or means of subsistence. The Committee further notes the author’s previous experience of an unsafe environment and violence emblematic of the living conditions of homeless asylum seekers in Italy. 9.5 Furthermore, the Committee notes that the author has relied on various reports on the general situation of asylum seekers and refugees in Italy, highlighting the chronic lack of available places in the reception facilities for asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection. The Committee notes in particular the author’s submission that returnees like herself, who had been granted a form of protection and benefited from the reception facilities when they were in Italy are no longer entitled to accommodation in the public reception centres for asylum seekers (see para. 6.3 above), live instead in informal settlements and often face destitution.29 The Committee notes the author’s submissions that returnees also face severe difficulties in obtaining access to sanitary facilities and food in Italy and that individuals should not be returned without specific guarantees of adequate accommodation. 9.6 The Committee also notes the finding of the Refugee Appeals Board that Italy should be considered the first country of asylum in the present case and the position of the State party that it is obliged to provide asylum seekers with basic human rights standards, although it is not required that such persons have the same social and living standards as nationals of the country (see para. 5.5 above). The Committee notes that the State party also referred to a decision of the European Court of Human Rights, in which the Court stated that, although the situation in Italy had its shortcomings, it had not disclosed a systemic failure to provide support or facilities catering for asylum seekers (see para. 5.9 above). 9.7 The Committee recalls that States parties should, when reviewing challenges to decisions to remove individuals from their territory, give sufficient weight to the real and personal risk such individuals might face if deported. 30 In particular, any evaluation of whether individuals are likely to be exposed to conditions constituting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of article 7 of the Covenant must be based not only on an assessment of the general conditions in the receiving country, but also on the individual circumstances of the persons in question. Those circumstances include factors that increase the vulnerability of such persons and that could transform a situation that is tolerable for 26 27 28 29 30 GE.19-07290 See X v. Denmark (CCPR/C/110/D/2007/2010), para. 9.2; A.R.J. v. Australia (CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996), para. 6.6; and X v. Sweden (CCPR/C/103/D/1833/2008), para. 5.18. See Z.H. v. Australia (CCPR/C/107/D/1957/2010), para. 9.3. See also Jasin v. Denmark, para. 8.3. See Y.A.A. and F.H.M. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/119/D/2681/2015), para. 7.3, and Rezaifar v. Denmark (CCPR/C/119/D/2512/2014), para. 9.3. See Jesuit Refugee Service, Protection Interrupted: the Dublin Regulation’s Impact on Asylum Seekers’ Protection, pp. 152 and 161. See also, for example, Médecins Sans Frontières “Out of sight. Asylum seekers and refugees in Italy: informal settlements and social marginalization” (2016), p. 8, and Asylum Information Database, “Country report: Italy” (2017), pp. 73–74. See, for example, Pillai et al. v. Canada (CCPR/C/101/D/1763/2008), paras. 11.2 and 11.4, and Ali and Mohamad v. Denmark (CCPR/C/116/D/2409/2014), para. 7.8. 9