Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights: A Practitioner’s Handbook be regarded as having validly introduced the application on his brother’s behalf even in the absence of a letter of authority.349 f) Death of the Victim Under certain circumstances, the Court may allow a close family member to “adopt” the application of an applicant who dies while the proceedings are pending or to allow another person to do so if they can claim the existence of a legitimate interest in doing so.350 Such a situation arose in the case of Aksoy v. Turkey. While the Court was considering Mr. Aksoy’s application – in which he complained of having been tortured in police custody – he was shot and killed by unknown assailants. The Court subsequently allowed the applicant’s father to pursue the case.351 Close family members are, routinely, parents, spouses or children of victims.352 Distant persons, such as executors of wills, have to show an intent as well as a legitimate interest in pursuing the application.353 As for that interest, the Court has noted that the transferability or otherwise of the applicant’s claim is not always decisive, for it is not only material interests which the successors of deceased applicants may pursue by their wish to maintain the application. Cases before the Court generally also have a moral or principled dimension, and persons close to an applicant may thus have a legitimate interest in obtaining a ruling even after that applicant’s death.354 In cases where no close relative wishes to pursue the application subsequent to the applicant’s death, the Court may decide to strike the application out of its list of cases, considering that the demise of the applicant constitutes a fact “of a kind to provide a solution of the matter.”355 However, where the subject matter of the case raises issues of general importance, the Court may continue to examine the case following the death of the applicant and despite the absence of a family member or an heir to adopt the case.356 Instructive in this context is the case of Karner v. Austria. 349 Ibid., § 55. The fact that an applicant lacks legal capacity for the purposes of national law and procedure for brain damage or other reasons, will not prevent him or her from exercising the right of individual application under Article 34 of the Convention; see Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, no. 6301/73, 24 October 1979, §§ 65–66. 350 See X v. France, no. 18020/91, 31 March 1992, § 26; Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071/96, 13 December 2000; Yanchev v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 16403/07, 20 March 2012. 351 Aksoy v. Turkey, no. 21987/93, 18 December 1996, § 7. 352 Vocaturo v. Italy, no. 11891/85, 24 May 1991, § 2; G. v. Italy, no. 12787/87, 27 February 1992, § 2; Pandolfelli and Palumbo v. Italy, no. 13218/87, 27 February 1992, § 2; X v. France, no. 18020/91, 31 March 1992, § 26, and Raimondo v. Italy, no. 12954/87, 22 February 1994, § 2. 353 S.G. v. France (striking out), no. 40669/98, 18 September 2001, §§ 6 and 16; Thévenon v. France (dec.), no. 2476/02, 28 February 2006; Léger v. France (striking out) [GC], no. 19324/02, 30 March 2009, §§ 47–51, and Mitev v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 42758/07, 29 June 2010. 354 Hristozov and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 47039/11 and 358/12, 29 April 2013, § 73, and Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071/96, 13 December 2000. 355 Scherer v. Switzerland, no. 17116/90, 25 March 1994, § 32. 356 See Karner v. Austria, no. 40016/98, 24 July 2003. 110