PART 2: How to Bring a Case to the Court This standard was also adopted by the Court in its judgment in the inter-State case of Ireland v. the United Kingdom, in which it stated that […] to assess [the] evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ but adds that such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. In this context, the conduct of the Parties when evidence is being obtained has to be taken into account.229 The high standard adopted by the Court has been the focus of intense criticism from a substantial number of the Court’s own judges over the years. For example, eight of the seventeen judges of the Grand Chamber in the case of Labita v. Italy stated the following in their dissenting opinion: We are accordingly of the view that the standard used for assessing the evidence in this case is inadequate, possibly illogical and even unworkable since, in the absence of an effective investigation, the applicant was prevented from obtaining evidence and the authorities even failed to identify the warders allegedly responsible for the ill-treatment complained of. If States may henceforth count on the Court’s refraining in cases such as the instant one from examining the allegations of ill-treatment for want of sufficient evidence, they will have an interest in not investigating such allegations, thus depriving the applicant of proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’… Lastly, it should be borne in mind that the standard of proof ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’ is, in certain legal systems, used in criminal cases. However, this Court is not called upon to judge an individual’s guilt or innocence or to punish those responsible for a violation; its task is to protect victims and provide redress for damage caused by the acts of the State responsible. The test, method and standard of proof in respect of responsibility under the Convention are different from those applicable in the various national systems as regards responsibility of individuals for criminal offences[…].230 The Court acknowledged the criticisms in its judgment of 6 July 2005 in the case of Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria and stated the following: In assessing evidence, the Court has adopted the standard of proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. However, it has never been its purpose to borrow the approach of the national legal systems that use that standard. Its role is not to rule on criminal guilt or civil liability but on Contracting States’ responsibility under the Convention. The specificity of its task under Article 19 of the Convention – to ensure the observance by the Contracting States of their engagement to secure the fundamental rights enshrined in the Convention – conditions its approach to the issues of evidence and proof. In the proceedings before the Court, there are no procedural barriers to the admissibility of evidence or pre-determined formulae for its assessment. It adopts the conclusions that are, in its view, supported by the free evaluation of all evidence, including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties’ submissions. According to its established case-law, proof may follow from the coexistence of 229 Ireland v. the United Kingdom, no. 5310/71, 18 January 1978, § 161. 230 Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, 6 April 2000, joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Pastro Ridruejo, Bonello, Makarczyk, Tulkens, Strážnická, Butkevych, Casadevall and Zupančič, § 1; Similarly, Judge Bonello in his dissenting opinion in the case of Sevtap Veznedaroğlu v. Turkey, no. 32357/96, 11 April 2000. 85