CAT/C/64/D/783/2016 individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies. The Committee notes that, in the present case, the State party has not challenged the admissibility of the communication on this ground. 7.3 The Committee considers that the communication, wherein the complainant claims to face a risk of being subjected to torture, or risk to his life, or inhuman or degrading treatment, if removed to the Islamic Republic of Iran, due to his sexual orientation, atheism and activities in support of a secular State, raises substantive issues under article 3 of the Convention, as the facts and the basis of the complainant’s claims have been adequately substantiated for the purpose of admissibility. 39 In the absence of any objection from the State party as to the admissibility of the present communication, the Committee finds no obstacle to admissibility and declares it admissible. Consideration of the merits 8.1 The Committee has considered the complaint in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention. 8.2 In the present case, the issue before the Committee is whether the removal of the complainant to the Islamic Republic of Iran would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 (1) of the Convention not to expel or to return (“refouler”) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 8.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Committee notes that, since the Islamic Republic of Iran is not a party to the Convention, in the event of a violation of the complainant’s Convention rights in that State, he would be deprived of the legal option of recourse to the Committee for protection of any kind.40 8.4 The Committee must take into account all relevant considerations in assessing the alleged risk of torture, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of the determination is to establish whether the complainant would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 41 8.5 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, according to which the Committee will assess “substantial grounds” and consider the risk of torture as foreseeable, personal, present and real when the existence of facts relating to the risk by itself, at the time of its decision, would affect the rights of the complainant under the Convention in case of his or her deportation. Indications of personal risk may include, but are not limited to: (a) the complainant’s ethnic background; (b) the political affiliation or political activities of the complainant and/or the complainant’s family members; (c) an arrest warrant having been issued against the complainant without a guarantee of fair treatment and a fair trial; and (d) the complainant being sentenced in absentia. With respect to the merits of a communication submitted under article 22 of the Convention, the burden of proof is upon the author of the communication, who has to present an arguable case, that is, to submit circumstantiated arguments showing that the danger of being subjected to torture is foreseeable, present, 39 40 41 10 See, inter alia, K.A. v. Sweden (CAT/C/39/D/308/2006), para. 7.2. See, for example, Tahmuresi v. Switzerland (CAT/C/53/D/489/2012), para. 7.7. See also R.H. v. Sweden (CAT/C/63/D/750/2016), para. 8.8. See, for example, E.K.W. v. Finland (CAT/C/54/D/490/2012), para. 9.3.