CCPR/C/119/D/2425/2014 But this does not render moot the State party’s intent to protect any fetal life until death. After all, we would never accept a death sentence carried out on a pregnant woman, irrespective of whether the pregnancy is viable or not. e Though the Committee in its findings under article 17 does not agree with the outcome of the State party’s balancing of the right to life of the unborn and the rights of the woman because the fetus was fatally ill in the present case, this does not warrant the conclusion that the difference in treatment of women who undergo an abortion and those who carry to term is based on a personal characteristic of the woman concerned. The Committee thus has failed to explain why the difference in treatment was based on an impermissible ground. 7. Even if we assumed that the denial of bereavement support was based on an impermissible ground, the author has neither submitted that local remedies have been exhausted in this respect nor that there is objectively no prospect of success to challenge the denial of bereavement support and post-abortion medical care in domestic proceedings. f Pursuant to article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol the Committee is therefore prevented from finding a violation of article 26 in this regard. 8. Finally, for the reasons given in my separate opinion in Mellet v. Ireland I do not agree with those members who would have preferred if the Committee had found a violation on the basis of sex and gender. I refer to my previous opinion. g I also repeat that the Committee should preserve the autonomous meaning of article 26 by giving due account to the notion of discrimination and to the grounds prohibited thereunder rather than presuming a violation of this provision whenever a violation of one of the other rights protected under the Covenant are found. An overbroad reading is unnecessary under our Covenanth and would deprive article 26 of its particular value. e f g h GE.17-10463 See article 6 (5) of the Covenant. The author only submitted that she had no reasonable prospect of success had she petitioned an Irish court for a termination of her pregnancy. See communication No. 2324/2013, Mellet v. Ireland, Views adopted on 31 March 2016. The Covenant provides not only for non-discrimination but also for substantive rights. The Committee, therefore, can deal with violations irrespective of whether they involve discrimination. 21