CCPR/C/119/D/2425/2014 (where limitations are based on reasonable and objective grounds.) The State party urges the Committee to follow the approach of the European Court of Human Rights, as set forth in A, B and C v. Ireland.10 Noting that Irish law permits travel abroad for the purposes of abortion, and provides for appropriate access to information and health care, the Court considered that the prohibition on abortion for reasons of health and/or well-being did not exceed the margin of appreciation accorded to member States. The Court struck a fair balance between the applicants’ privacy rights and the rights invoked on behalf of the fetus, which were based upon the profound moral views of the Irish people about the nature of life. The Court found a violation of applicant C’s right to private and family life under article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights), in that no accessible and effective procedure enabled her to establish whether she qualified for lawful termination of pregnancy. Academic analyses and discussions indicate that many of the Committee’s decisions reveal choices that are consistent with the doctrine of margin of appreciation.11 4.3 Following the above-mentioned judgment, the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013 was adopted in Ireland. Under the Act, abortion is permitted where there is a threat to the life of the woman due to physical illness and in emergencies. The Act also addresses situations where there is a real and substantial risk of loss of the woman’s life by way of suicide. The Act reaffirms an individual’s right to travel to another State and the right to obtain and make available information relating to services lawfully available in another country. Under the Act, intentional destruction of unborn human life is an offence punishable by a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years. 4.4 The gradual evolution of Irish law on abortion, produced by the democratic process of consultation, debate and direct action of inclusion, has at all times attempted to seek a careful balance between the constitutional right to life of the unborn with equal regard to that of the mother. Moreover, any measures the State party has taken have not been disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued of protecting life. While the author argues that prenatal rights and life are excluded from protection under the Covenant, article 6 (5) prohibits imposition of the death penalty for pregnant women. Thus, it cannot be concluded that the Covenant does not afford any protection to the right to life of the unborn child. Claims under article 7 4.5 In K.N.L.H. v. Peru, the State party had allegedly denied the author access to a lawfully available therapeutic abortion when she was pregnant with an anencephalic fetus. In the absence of observations from the State party, the Committee deemed that this constituted arbitrary interference with the author’s right to privacy. However, in the present case, the State party did not deny the author access to lawful abortion procedures. Such a procedure was not available to the author, and she was clearly and properly informed of this by the relevant State agents. Accordingly, and contrary to what occurred in K.N.L.H. v. Peru, there were no actions on the part of State agents that were or could be described as having been based on the personal prejudices of officials in the health system. 12 Thus, in the present case, none of the author’s rights was arbitrarily interfered with so as to result in cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. 4.6 According to the State party: “If any findings were made in this case, in the absence of arbitrary actions of agents of the State, but on the basis of evolved constitutional and legal principles, this would represent a significant difference in kind (as opposed to a difference in degree) in the jurisprudence of the Committee.” Such a finding would be contrary to paragraph 2 of general comment No. 20 (1992) on the prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, according to which it is the 10 11 12 GE.17-10463 Application No. 25579/05, judgment of 16 December 2010. The State party cites, inter alia, Yuval Shany, “Toward a general margin of appreciation doctrine in international law?”, The European Journal of International Law, vol. 16, No. 5 (2005), p. 929. According to the State party, the same argument applies with respect to the Views of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on communication No. 22/2009, L.C. v. Peru, adopted on 17 October 2011, and those of the Human Rights Committee on communication No. 1608/2007, L.M.R. v. Argentina, adopted on 29 March 2011. 7