CCPR/C/119/D/2425/2014 duty of the State party to afford everyone protection through legislative and other measures as may be necessary against the acts prohibited by article 7, whether inflicted by people acting in their official capacity, outside their official capacity or in a private capacity. In the present case, there was no act of “infliction” by any person or State agent; therefore, there was no cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 4.7 The State party has not engaged in cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, given that: (a) There are significant and material factual differences between the cases the author relies upon and her own situation; (b) In circumstances where the author’s life was not in danger, the procedure for obtaining a lawful abortion in Ireland was clear. The decision was made by a patient in consultation with her doctor. If the patient did not agree, she was free to seek another medical opinion and, in the last resort, she could make an emergency application to the High Court. There is no factual evidence that State agents were responsible for any arbitrary interference with this decision-making process, or that they were responsible for any act of “infliction”; (c) The grounds for lawful abortion were well-known in Ireland and were applied in accordance with 40.3.3 of the Constitution, the grounds as elucidated by the Supreme Court in the X case, the Medical Council guidelines and the Crisis Pregnancy Agency guidelines; (d) While the author states that she was aware that abortion was not allowed but had no idea that a termination on medical grounds would fall into the same category, this was her subjective understanding of the law; (e) The hospital staff were clear that a termination was not possible in Ireland, and therefore, no arbitrary decision-making processes or acts of infliction that caused or contributed to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment can be suggested; (f) The State party’s position and stance in relation to its law sought to achieve a reasonable, careful and difficult balance of competing rights as between the fetus and the woman; (g) Covenant. The State party sought that balance in accordance with article 25 of the Claims under article 17 4.8 The State party did not violate the author’s rights to privacy or integrity under article 17 of the Covenant. If there were any interference with her privacy, this was neither arbitrary nor unlawful. Rather, it was proportionate to the legitimate aims of the Covenant, taking into account a careful balance between the right to life of the fetus with due regard to that of the woman. The advice given to the author by the hospital was properly and lawfully given. The State party is permitted to create laws, in accordance with and in the spirit of article 25 of the Covenant, which allow for a balancing of competing rights. 4.9 In the aforementioned A, B and C case, the European Court of Human Rights considered that “the impugned prohibition in Ireland struck a fair balance between the right of the first and second applicants to respect for their private lives and the rights invoked on behalf of the unborn”. The balance to be achieved has been considered by the Irish electorate on numerous occasions. 4.10 In K.N.L.H. v. Peru and L.M.R. v. Argentina, in which the Committee found violations of article 17, existing legislation allowed for therapeutic terminations of pregnancy. The authors in those cases were initially told that they qualified for lawful terminations, but these rights were then not protected by the States in question. In the instant case, no such conflict arose, as the hospital gave its clear opinion that a termination of pregnancy would not be available in Ireland. Therefore, the arbitrary interference that occurred in those cases did not occur in the present case. 8 GE.17-10463