“A treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” “…at the individual level, that is, that of criminal liability, it would seem that one of the consequences of the jus cogens character bestowed by the international community upon the prohibition of torture is that every State is entitled to investigate, prosecute and punish or extradite individuals accused of torture, who are present in a territory under its jurisdiction. Indeed, it would be inconsistent on the one hand to prohibit torture to such an extent as to restrict the normally unfettered treaty-making power of sovereign States, and on the other hand bar States from prosecuting and punishing those torturers who have engaged in this odious practice abroad. This legal basis for States’ universal jurisdiction over torture bears out and strengthens the legal foundation for such jurisdiction found by other courts in the inherently universal character of the crime.”242 However, a judgment by the European Court of Human Rights in November 2001 appears to limit the legal implications of this jus cogens status. At issue in the case was whether a national law, which granted immunity to a foreign government in a civil suit claiming compensation for torture, constituted a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights.243 By a narrow majority the Court, while accepting that the prohibition of torture has achieved the status of a peremptory norm in international law, found that it was unable to discern: “61. … in the international instruments, judicial authorities or other materials before it any firm basis for concluding that, as a matter of international law, a State no longer enjoys immunity from civil suit in the courts of another State where acts of torture are alleged.” Similarly, there is nothing in Congo v. Belgium to suggest that the International Court of Justice would find that a jus cogens norm supersedes jurisdictional immunities in international law. III. THEMATIC SUMMARY OF SOME CENTRAL ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE CONVENTION 3. THE PROHIBITION OF TORTURE AS A NORM OF JUS COGENS While the rule of jus cogens in theory only implies that provisions of other treaties are void if they conflict with a norm of jus cogens, there have been some suggestions that the consequence of the jus cogens status of the prohibition of torture is that States are justified in exercising universal jurisdiction over the crime of torture irrespective of whether they are Parties to the Convention against Torture.241 A Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia recently stated that: 67