CAT/C/71/D/754/2016 Consideration of the merits 10.1 In accordance with 22 (4) of the Convention, the Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties. 10.2 The issue before the Committee is whether the forced removal of the complainant to Sri Lanka would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return (“refouler”) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 10.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment commensurate with a risk of torture upon return to Sri Lanka. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of the evaluation is to establish whether the complainant would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances.26 10.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, according to which the nonrefoulement obligation exists whenever there are “substantial grounds” for believing that the person concerned would be in danger of being subjected to torture in a State to which he or she is facing removal, either as an individual or a member of a group that may be at risk of being tortured in the State of destination. The Committee also recalls that “substantial grounds” exist whenever the risk of torture is “foreseeable, personal, present and real”. 27 The Committee gives considerable weight to findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party concerned, while at the same time it is not bound by such findings and instead has the power, by virtue of article 22 (4) of the Convention, of free assessment of the facts based upon the full set of circumstances in every case. 10.5 The Committee notes the complainant’s claim that he would be at risk of being subjected to torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to Sri Lanka through prolonged detention and interrogation at the hands of the Criminal Investigation Department and the guards of the Negombo Prison, owing to his status as failed asylum seeker, his illegal departure from Sri Lanka, his Tamil ethnicity, Muslim faith, possible associations with LTTE and denunciation of election violence. The complainant also submits that the danger posed by the death threats against him remains current and that, given the inaction on the side of the police, the authors of the threats must have political influence. 10.6 The Committee also notes that the authorities of the State concluded that there were no substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would face a foreseeable, present, personal and real risk of harm, including torture, upon return to Sri Lanka. In this regard, the Committee observes that the authorities of the State party identified inconsistencies affecting the credibility of material elements of the complainant’s account, including his assistance to his brother’s campaign, the number of people whom he refused to allow to vote and of the other polling agents, whether or not the men who were refused to vote tried to assault him, whether or not the complainant was the only polling agent to check the identity cards of these people and how much time passed between the election day and the first telephone call. The Committee notes that the Refugee Review Tribunal accepted that there had been interpretation difficulties in the entry interview and that it did therefore not rely on any 26 27 See, for example, S.K. and others v. Sweden (CAT/C/54/D/550/2013), para. 7.3. General comment No. 4, para. 11. 9