CAT/C/30/D/191/2001 page 8 4.4 With respect to the complainant’s claim under article 3 of the Convention, the State party submits that, even if a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights existed in Sri Lanka, the existence of such a pattern would not as such constitute a sufficient ground for determining that a particular person would be at risk of being subjected to torture upon return to that country. According to the Committee’s jurisprudence,4 specific grounds must exist indicating that the individual concerned would be personally at risk of being subjected to torture. The State party also refers to the Committee’s jurisprudence that “substantial grounds” in article 3 require more than a mere possibility of torture.5 4.5 In the State party’s view, the complainant would not run a real, personal and foreseeable risk of being tortured if he were returned to Sri Lanka. The mere fact that he is a Tamil does not in itself constitute sufficient grounds to establish such a risk. Moreover, the State party submits that the complainant’s statements lack credibility. This was reflected by the contradiction in his statement that his wife was three months pregnant in June 1996, and the fact that she gave birth in May 1997. The complainant had not been able to explain this contradiction when confronted with that question before the IND commission on 11 February 1999. Only in a letter of 26 February 1999 of his lawyer, he admitted that he had not been “hiding” in Mullaitivu and that he had met his wife after her miscarriage, while he was staying in Mullaitivu. The State party submits that this explanation differs in essential points from his earlier statements. Such discrepancy cannot, in the State party’s view, be explained solely by criticizing the poor quality of the translation of the complainant’s statements. Even if his cultural background prevented the complainant from speaking about his wife’s miscarriage, there was no need for him to make incorrect statements about his stay in Mullaitivu. The State party also considers his credibility undermined by his statements regarding his escape from the military camp in Trincomalee. It was unlikely that he could escape from the camp without any difficulty, while Sri Lankan soldiers stood watching. 4.6 The State party adds that the complainant has not convincingly established that the Sri Lankan authorities would treat him as a suspect. His claim that he would encounter problems with the authorities was based on speculation unsupported by objective facts, the only evidence substantiating his claims being the letters from his family and friends. With respect to possible sanctions by the LTTE which the complainant would have to fear upon return to the LTTE-controlled part of Sri Lanka, the State party argues that such sanctions fall outside the definition of torture in article 1 and, therefore, outside the scope of article 3 of the Convention. Since according to article 1, “the term ‘torture’ means any act […] inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity”, acts by non-State entities such as the LTTE could not, for the purposes of the Convention, be considered to constitute torture.6 4.7 As to the Amnesty International medical examination group report, the State party submits that it merely confirms that the complainant’s medical symptoms are partly consistent with his allegations. It did not imply that he had satisfactorily established that these symptoms, as well as scars on his body, were the result of torture. 4.8 The State party concludes that, in the light of the general situation in Sri Lanka and the personal circumstances of the complainant, no substantial grounds exist for believing that the complainant would run a real, personal and foreseeable risk of being subjected to torture upon his return to Sri Lanka, in violation of article 3 of the Convention.