CAT/C/63/D/744/2016 Advance unedited version including whether it conducted a thorough analysis of the elements related to the merits of the case.31 6.6 Consequently, the Committee considers that it is not precluded from reviewing the present communication by virtue of article 22 (5) (a) of the Convention. 6.7 Finally, the Committee notes the State party’s argument that the complaint should be held inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. The Committee, however, considers that the complaint has been sufficiently substantiated for purposes of admissibility, because the complainant’s allegations of a risk of torture or ill-treatment in case of his forced removal to Iraq raise issues under article 3 of the Convention. As the Committee finds no further obstacles to admissibility, it concludes that the communication is admissible. Consideration of the merits 7.1 The Committee has considered the present complaint in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties concerned, in accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention. 7.2 The issue before the Committee is whether the forced removal of the complainant to Iraq would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return (“refouler”) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. In that connection, the Committee notes that the complainant invokes a danger with respect to both Iraq and Iran. However, given that the Swedish authorities have ordered his removal to Iraq, the Committee will consider the present communication only in respect to that country. 7.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to Iraq. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. The Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances.32 7.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention, in which it states that “substantial grounds” for believing that the person concerned would be in danger of being subjected to torture in a State to which he or she is facing deportation exist whenever the risk of torture is “foreseeable, personal, present and real.”33. Normally, “the burden of proof is upon the author of the communication who has to present an arguable case – i.e. to submit circumstantiated arguments showing that the danger of being subjected to torture is foreseeable, present, personal and real.”34. The Committee gives considerable weight to findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party concerned, while at the same time it is not bound by such 31 32 33 34 12 See S. v. Sweden (CAT/C/59/D/691/2015), paras. 7.4 and 7.5. See, for example, Y.B.F., S.A.Q. and Y.Y. v. Switzerland (CAT/C/50/D/467/2011), para. 7.2; R.S.M. v. Canada (CAT/C/50/D/392/2009), para. 7.3; and E.J.V.M. v. Sweden (CAT/C/31/D/213/2002), para. 8.3. See the Committee’s general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, para. 11. Ibid., para. 38. Also see, for example, N.T.W. v. Switzerland (CAT/C/48/D/414/2010), para. 7.3, and No. 343/2008, Kalonzo v. Canada (CAT/C/48/D/343/2008), para. 9.3.