CAT/C/58/D/627/2014 emphasizes that the complainant was questioned about his medical status during the asylum proceedings and was encouraged to submit documents substantiating his claim. 4.20 Furthermore, the State party notes that within the appeals proceedings, the complainant submitted to the Migration Court an “invalidity” certificate issued on 17 October 2013. In that regard, the complainant refers to the judgment by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of R.C. v. Sweden13and maintains that the “invalidity” certificate, together with the medical certificate from Bangladesh gave a very clear indication that his injuries could be the result of torture. Even though the certificate he submitted supports the existence of injuries, in the State party’s view however, there are still uncertainties about how, when and why the injuries were inflicted on the complainant. In that connection, the State party refers to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of I. v. Sweden,14 in which the Court concluded that in order for a State to dispel doubts about evidence, it must at least be in a position to assess the asylum seeker’s individual situation. However, that may be impossible when there is no proof of the asylum seeker’s identity and when the statement provided to substantiate the asylum request gives reason to question his or her credibility. According to the established case-law of the Court, it is in principle up to the applicants to adduce evidence proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that in case of deportation he or she would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to article 3 of the Convention. Where such evidence is adduced, it is for the Government to dispel any doubts about it. 4.21 Accordingly, the European Court of Human Rights considered that where an asylum seeker invokes past ill-treatment that he or she has suffered, whether undisputed or supported by evidence, it may nevertheless be expected that he or she indicates that there are substantial and concrete grounds for believing that, upon return to the home country he or she would be exposed to a risk of such treatment again. In that context, the State party considers, as does the Migration Court, that the medical and invalidity certificates submitted by the complainant support his asylum account to a certain extent but that the written evidence is not such that he is considered to have plausibly demonstrated his need for protection on the basis of that evidence. 4.22 Before the Committee, the complainant claims that his long-lasting political and religious commitment led him to becoming a well-known local representative of the party. The State party, however, points out that during the interview with the Migration Agency on 2 May 2012, the complainant held that his political involvement primarily consisted of reading the Koran and campaigning for the introduction of Sharia law. In addition, the State party submits that the complainant has failed to demonstrate at the domestic level his alleged need for protection is plausible, as his asylum account regarding the structure of the party and his own function in the party were vague and lacking in detail. The Migration Agency noted in particular that the complainant was unable to expand in more detail on how the party works to achieve its goals in society; he had great difficulty outlining his duties within the party; and despite his stated position of secretary to the vice-president of the party, he was unable to present any concrete account of his duties. He also demonstrated a lack of knowledge of the names of the party’s leading members. Furthermore, the complainant spoke in general terms regarding the party leader’s imprisonment. The State party thus considers that the complainant has not plausibly demonstrated that he was such an active and prominent member of the party that it would warrant any great interest from anyone from the larger parties. 13 14 Application No. 41827/07, judgment of 9 March 2010. Application No 61204/09, judgment of 5 September 2013. 9