Advance unedited version CCPR/C/132/D/2361/2014 facilities of the Vitebsk region, including the chief medical doctor of the clinic, Mr. M.E.V. and his deputy, Ms. P.I.V (see para. 2.1 above). The Committee also notes the undisputed fact that the author submitted numerous complaints to courts and the prosecutor’s office. The Committee further notes that the independent examination dated 14 April 2014 (see para. 5.2 above) concluded that the author was not a danger to himself or others, and did not need to be hospitalized. The Committee further notes the findings of the Vitebsk District and Regional Court do not contain any examples of the author being a danger to himself and/or others, nor an assessment that his involuntary hospitalization was required as a measure of last resort. On the basis of the information available, the Committee concludes that the decisions to commit the author to psychiatric clinic caused him substantial anguish and mental suffering on the basis of persistent fear for his health and freedom.20 Accordingly, the Committee is of the view that, in the present case, the author’s involuntary hospitalization and the subjection of the author to medical treatment despite his opposition amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment within the meaning of article 7 of the Covenant. 7.8 The Committee also notes the author’s claims that his right to a fair and public hearings has been violated when the initial hearing on 21 August 2013, the subsequent appeal of 12 September 2013, and the supervisory appeal procedures were all closed to public, and the author and his lawyers were not present, despite their written requests. The Committee notes that while the requirements of article 14(1) of the Covenant generally apply to criminal cases and suits at law, the “notion may also extend to acts that are criminal in nature with sanctions that, regardless of their qualification in domestic law, must be regarded as penal because of their purpose, character or severity”. 21 The Committee also considers that some detention regimes that result in confinement, as in the present case, attempt to bypass the controls imposed by the rules of criminal procedure. In the present case, the Committee notes the author’s claim that the involuntary hospitalization upon the prosecutor’s request is punishment for his criticism to the regional authorities. In the absence of any pertinent explanations from the State party, the Committee considers that due weight must be given to the author’s allegations, and finds that, based on the purpose, character and severity of his involuntary hospitalization, the guarantees of article 14(1) of the Covenant apply. Accordingly, the Committee concludes that, in the circumstances of the present case, the facts as presented by the author amount to a violation of the author’s rights under articles 14 (1) of the Covenant. 7.9 The Committee notes the author’s claim that his psychiatric detention from 15 August 2013 and subsequent involuntary hospitalization were imposed on the author to silence him, and amounted to a restriction of his right to impart information and ideas which was incompatible with article 19(3) of the Covenant. 7.10 The Committee refers to its General comment No. 34 (2011) on the freedoms of opinion and expression, according to which freedom of opinion and freedom of expression are indispensable conditions for the full development of the person. They are essential for any society and constitute the foundation stone for every free and democratic society. 22 According to article 19(3) of the Covenant, freedom of expression can be subject to certain restrictions but only those which are provided by law and are necessary: (a) for respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. 23 All restrictions imposed on freedom of expression must be “provided by law”; they may only be imposed for one of the grounds set out in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of article 19(3); and they must conform to the strict tests of necessity and proportionality. The principle of proportionality has to be respected not only in the law that frames the restrictions but also by the administrative and judicial authorities in applying the law.24 When a State party invokes a legitimate ground for restriction of freedom of expression, it must demonstrate in specific and individualized fashion the precise nature of the threat to any of the enumerated grounds listed in article 19(3) that has caused it to 20 21 22 23 24 6 Ibid, para. 7.16. Communication No. 1015/2001, Perterer v. Austria, para. 9.2. General comment No. 34, op. cit., para. 2. Ibid., para. 28. Ibid., para. 34.