Section 3 Autonomy and Places of Deprivation of Liberty In the spring of 2014, while visiting a specially-equipped hospitalisation unit (UHSA), that is to say a psychiatric treatment unit for prisoners, the inspectors were present during a scene which took place in the dining room: the patients had sat down at the table; one of them was balancing on the two back legs of a chair, with his feet on the ground. Three members of medical staff were present for the meal, gathered together in a corner of the room and watching over and/or supervising the patients. One of the members of medical staff then raised his voice from their place in the room, in an unkind manner, in order to enjoin the person concerned to sit properly. The man, who was about forty years old, immediately and silently obeyed. What argument could be used to justify this man being thus publicly treated like a child? His illness? His usual behaviour? Any possible risk? A little later in the day, the inspectors had interviews with the medical staff. None of them had attached any special importance to this scene. Nothing in the patient’s previous history or personality appeared to have justified this admonition. General justifications of a security nature were subsequently put forward: it was important to “control the situation”, “to avoid things getting out of hand”, one could never tell what might happen. On the assumption that action had been necessary, all were agreed that it would have been preferable to have done it in a more discreet manner. A scene of this kind is neither exceptional nor caricatured. It is no way intended to stigmatise any individual medical workers, whose capacities for dialogue were moreover noted by the inspectors. It simply illustrates how far the combination of routine and tensions may lead to regrettable behaviours, which are sometimes devoid of all sense. It is perhaps only a reflection, or consequence at the individual level, of the concerns that guide and limit the action of the administrations and departments: “security” and “effectiveness”. Security concerns are naturally understandable, with regard to institutions catering for persons considered to be dangerous, particularly when the staff are few in number and inadequately trained. They nevertheless cannot apply in a uniform manner and without distinction to all patients hospitalised in psychiatric wards and all prisoners. Effectiveness refers to the need to cater for what are sometimes large groups of persons, often in difficult circumstances in view of the number of officers and the working conditions. It is, of course, a legitimate concern. However, it raises the question of determining how far and to what point the individual becomes secondary in the face of these considerations. How far are demands for individual liberty legitimate or, on the contrary, disqualified and prohibited? It is beyond doubt that the same person would have been just as sharply snubbed, had they wanted to go to the toilet or eat some cheese after their desert. It is not a question of disputing the need for rules - which are a factor of organisation and order and a frame of reference -, but of establishing what it is that they protect, what they allow and what they prevent since, as Simone Weil wrote, “liberty is not greater or lesser according to 81