hours before. His conclusion, which was not challenged, implied that the author was already in police custody when the deceased was shot. The information was available to the Court; given the seriousness of its implications, the Court should have brought it to the attention of the jury, even though it was not mentioned by counsel. Furthermore, even if the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had chosen to rely on the facts relating to the post-mortem evidence, it could not have addressed the matter as it was introduced for the first time at that stage. In all the circumstances, and especially given that the trial of the author was for a capital offence, this omission must, in the Committee’s view, be deemed a denial of justice and as such constitutes a violation of article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. This remains so even if the placing of this evidence before the jury might not, in the event, have changed their verdict and the outcome of the case. copy of which was transmitted by the Committee to the State party on 28 April 1989. Furthermore, while the allegation of a violation of article 10 does not expressly figure under the header “Alleged Breaches of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” (page 8 of the author’s initial communication), reference to ill-treatment by the police is made on pages 51 and 52 of this communication, which was integrally transmitted to the Government of Jamaica a year and a half before the Committee’s decision on admissibility. In the circumstances, the State party cannot claim that it was not apprised of the allegation of ill-treatment: nor is the Committee barred from considering the author’s submission in its integrity, or from proceeding with its own evaluation as to whether the facts as presented may raise issues under certain provisions of the Covenant, even if these provisions have not been specifically invoked. 8.1 With respect to the alleged violations of the Covenant, four issues are before the Committee: (a) whether the judge showed bias in his evaluation of the evidence or in his instructions to the jury; (b) whether the overlooking of the significance of the time of death amounted to a violation of the author’s right to a fair trial; (c) whether the author was afforded adequate time for the preparation of his defence and could secure the examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him: and (d) whether the alleged ill-treatment by the police violated his rights under article 10. 8.4 The right of an accused person to, have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his or her defence is an important element of the guarantee of a fair trial and a corollary of the principle of equality of arms. In cases in which a capital sentence may be pronounced, it is axiomatic that sufficient time must be granted to the accused and his or her counsel to prepare the defence for the trial; this requirement applies to all the stages of the judicial proceedings. The determination of what constitutes “adequate time” requires an assessment of the individual circumstances of each case. There was considerable pressure to start the trial as scheduled on 17 March 1983, particularly because of the return of the deceased’s wife from the United States to give evidence; moreover, it is uncontested that Mr. Wright’s counsel was instructed only on the very morning the trial was scheduled to start and, accordingly, had less than one day to prepare Mr. Wright’s defence and the cross-examination of witnesses. However, it is equally uncontested that no adjournment of the trial was requested by either of Mr. Wright’s counsel. The Committee therefore does not consider that the inadequate preparation of the defence may be attributed to the judicial authorities of the State party; if counsel had felt that they were not properly prepared, it was incumbent upon them to request the adjournment of the trial. Accordingly, the Committee finds no violation of article 14, paragraph 3(b). 8.2 With respect to the first issue, the Committee reaffirms its established jurisprudence that it is generally for the appellate courts of States parties to the Covenant to evaluate facts and evidence in a particular case. It is not in principle for the Committee to make such an evaluation or to review specific instructions to the jury by the judge, unless it can be ascertained that the instructions to the jury were clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice, or that the judge manifestly violated his obligation of impartiality. In the present case, the Committee has been requested to examine matters belonging in the latter category. 8.3 n respect of the issue of the significance of the time of death of the victim, the Committee begins by noting that the postmortem on the deceased was performed on 1 September 1981 at approximately 1 p.m., and that the expert concluded that death had occurred forty-seven 8.5 With respect to the alleged violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (e), it is uncontested that 105