conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned” (emphasis added). APPENDIX III Individual opinion submitted by Mr. Nisuke Ando, pursuant to rule 92, paragraph 3, of the Committee’s rules of procedure, concerning the Committee’s decision to declare inadmissible communication No. 354/1989, L. G. v. Mauritius While I do not intend to rule out this possibility, I feel obliged to express my concern about legal systems under which no retrial is permissible and pardon remains the only available recourse in such cases. For one thing,a retrial provides an opportunity for the judiciary to reexamine its own conviction and sentence in the light of fresh evidence and correct its errors. In my opinion, pardon being the prerogative of the executive, the institution of retrial is essential far the principle of independence of the judiciary. Furthermore, retrial ensures that the erroneously convicted person is given an opportunity to have his or her case re-examined in the light of fresh evidence, and to be declared innocent. If he or she is innocent, it would be difficult to justify why he or she should need to be pardoned pursuant to the prerogative of the executive. I do not oppose the Committee’s view that the author’s claim that Mauritian law does not provide for a retrial in cases in which fresh material evidence becomes available after the conclusion of the trial has not been substantiated (paragraph 5.2). However, had the claim been substantiated, the Committee would have been required to determine the compatibility with the provision of article 14, paragraph 6, of a legal system under which no retrial is permissible and pardon remains the only recourse available for a convicted person, even if fresh evidence conclusively shows that the conviction was pronounced erroneously. In this connection, I would like to make the following observations. APPENDIX IV Article 14, paragraph 6, provides that: “when a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered the punishment as a result of such a conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.’• Individual opinion submitted by Mr. Bertil Wennergren, pursuant to rule 92, paragraph 3, of the Committee’s rules of procedure, concerning the Committee’s decision to declare inadmissible communication No. 354/1989, L. G. v. Mauritius I associate myself with the individual opinion submitted by Mrs. Rosalyn Higgins and Mr. Amos Wako, but I want to draw attention to the wording of article 14, paragraph 6, where it indicates the &round for. a reversal of conviction of pardon, namely “that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice”. Such a &round should according to my opinion justify a claim under article 14, paragraph 5, regarding the availability of review of conviction and sentence by a higher tribunal according to law. However, the Committee’s decision, as explained in paragraph 5.2, makes it clear that the author has failed to advance such a claim. It is possible to argue that this provision presupposes not only a legal system under which retrial is institutionalized, but also a legal system which does not allow for a retrial and under which pardon remains the only recourse available for the convicted person, even where new or newly discovered facts show conclusively that the conviction was arrived at erroneously, on the ground of the provision’s wording “when his _______________ 15