contends that he was unable to obtain the attendance of witnesses. It is to be noted, however, that the material before the Committee does not disclose whether either counsel or author complained to the trial judge that the time or facilities were inadequate. Furthermore, there is no indication that counsel decided not to call witnesses in the exercise of his professional judgement, or that, if a request to call witnesses was made, the trial judge disallowed it. The Committee therefore finds no violation of article 14, paragraph 3(b) and (e). was not in due time afforded the opportunity to obtain, on his own initiative, a decision by the court on the lawfulness of his detention. 5.7 In as much as the author’s claim under article 10 is concerned, the Committee reaffirms that the obligation to treat individuals with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person encompasses the provision of, inter alia, adequate medical care during detention.1 The provision of basic sanitary facilities to detained persons equally falls within the ambit of article 10. The .Committee further considers that the provision of inadequate food to detained individuals and the total absence of recreational facilities does not, save under exceptional circumstances, meet the requirements of article 10. In the author’s case, the State party has not refuted the author’s allegation that he has contracted health problems as a result of a lack of basic medical care, and that he is only allowed out of his cell for 30 minutes each day. As a result, his right under article 10, paragraph 1, of the Covenant has been violated. 5.10 As to the issue of the author’s representation, in particular before the Court of Appeal, the Committee recalls that it is axiomatic that legal assistance should be made available to a convicted prisoner under sentence of death. This applies to all the stages of the judicial proceedings. In the author’s case, it is clear that legal assistance was assigned to him for the appeal. What is at issue is whether his counsel had a right to abandon the appeal without prior consultation with the author. The author’s application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, dated 23 February 1983, indicates that he did not wish to be present during the hearing of the appeal, but that he wished legal aid to be assigned for this purpose. Subsequently, and without previously consulting with the author, counsel opined that there was no merit in the appeal, thus effectively leaving the author without legal representation. The Committee is of the opinion that while article 14, paragraph 3(d), does not entitle the accused to choose counsel provided to him free of charge, measures must be taken to ensure that counsel, once assigned, provides effective representation in the interests of justice. This includes consulting with, and informing, the accused if he intends to withdraw an appeal or to argue before the appeals court that the appeal has no merit. 5.8 Article 14, paragraph 3 (a), requires that any individual under criminal charges shall be informed promptly and in detail of the nature and the charges against him. The requirement of prompt information, however, only applies once the individual has been formally charged with a criminal offence. It does not apply to, those remanded in custody pending the result of police investigations: the latter situation is covered by article 9, paragraph 2, of the Covenant. In the present case, the State party has not denied that the author was not apprised in any detail of the reasons for his arrest for several weeks following his apprehension and that he was not informed about the facts of the crime in connection with which he was detained or about the identity of the victim. The Committee concludes that the requirements of article 9, paragraph 2, were not met. 5.11 With respect to the claim of “undue delay” in the proceedings against the author, two issues arise. The author contends that his right, under article 14, paragraph 3(c), to be tried without “undue delay” was violated because almost 18 months elapsed between his arrest and the opening of the trial. While the Committee reaffirms, as it did in its general comment on article 14, that all stages of the judicial proceedings should take place without undue delay, it cannot conclude that a lapse of a year and a half between the arrest and the start of the trial constituted “undue delay”, as there is no suggestion that pre-trial investigations could 5.9 The right of an accused person to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence is an important element of the guarantee of a fair trial and an important aspect of the principle of equality of arms. In cases in which capital sentence may be pronounced on the accused, it is axiomatic that sufficient time must be granted to the accused and his counsel to prepare the defence for the trial. The determination of what constitutes “adequate time” requires an assessment of the individual circumstances of each case. The author also 65