paragraph 3(g), everyone shall, in the determination of any criminal charge against him, be entitled not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. This means that during criminal proceedings, neither the prosecutor nor the judge nor anyone else may threaten the accused or otherwise try to exert pressure on him, so as to force him to testify against himself or to confess guilt. by Mr. Terán Jijón under duress were put, to see to it that these documents are returned to him or destroyed, and to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future. 9. The Committee would appreciate receiving information, within ninety days, from the State party in respect of measures adopted pursuant to the Committee’s Views. It also would violate the principle of objectivity and impartiality if such incidents were to occur; it would further entail a violation of article 14, paragraph 3(g) if testimony or a confession obtained through compulsion n pre-trial interrogation were to be introduced as evidence. Article 15 of the Convention against Torture confirms this view by prescribing that each State party shall ensure that any statement which is found to have been made as a result of torture shall not be introduced as evidence in any judicial proceedings, except against an individual accused of torture, as evidence that the statement was made. APPENDIX Individual opinion submitted by Mr. Bertil Wennergren, pursuant to rule 94, paragraph 3, of the rules of procedure, concerning the Views of the Committee on communication No. 277/1988, Juan Terán Jijón v. Ecuador I concur with the Committee’s Views with the exception of the findings, in paragraph 5.4, on Mr. Terán’s claim that he was forced to sign ten blank sheets of paper during the interrogation that took place when he was kept in incommunicado detention and subjected to maltreatment. The Committee has expressed the view, in paragraph 5.2, that the evidence submitted is sufficiently compelling to justify the conclusion that Mr. Terán Jijón was subjected to treatment prohibited under article 7 of the Covenant, and that he was not treated with respect for the inherent dignity of his person (in violation of article 10, paragraph 1). However, the Committee found that the element of signing ten blank sheets of paper did not raise an issue under article 14, paragraph 3(g). In that respect, I disagree. Nevertheless, it is difficult to avoid that an incrimination or confession, in spite of their not being given any weight as evidence, case a shadow on the accused. All attempts to compel a person to incriminate him/herself or to confess guilt should thus be prevented. It is not unusual that, as a method of compulsion, an interrogator forces the accused to sign blank papers, insinuating that incriminations or confessions of crimes more serious than the ones he is accused of, would be added. In so doing, the interrogator of course violates articles 7 and 10, paragraph 1, but, in my opinion, he also violates article 14, paragraph 3(g). That conclusion follows my conviction that no form of compulsion to make an individual incriminate him/herself or to confess guilt, can be accepted; this is so regardless of whether it is an express incrimination or merely a hypothetical one. There is always the risk that what has been signed or recorded may exercise undue influence on the issue of proof in the determination of criminal charges at a subsequent stage. I first note that the State party has not addressed Mr. Terán’s allegation that he was forced to sign these blank sheets. In the circumstances, there is sufficient reason to believe that the allegation is based on verifiable events. I therefore believe that the Committee’s findings should have been made on the basis of these facts as found. Pursuant to article 14, 79