inadmissible communication No. 354/1989, L. G. v. Mauritius amounts to no more than a personal conclusion drawn from evidence available at the time. Moreover, the State party observes, the Mauritian courts acted properly in deciding to rely on the evidence presented by the author’s own client and that of other witnesses, after having directed them properly on issues of law, and that the object of the communication would convert the Human Rights Committee into a Court of Appeal on findings of fact. The authors of the present individual opinion endorse the Committee’s decision to declare this communication inadmissible. Nevertheless, they do not consider it possible to single out, as is done in paragraph 5.3 of the text of the decision, one provision of the Covenant among those referred to by the author of the communication in order to declare that the communication is incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant within the meaning of article 3 of the Optional Protocol. The issues before the Committee 5.1 Before considering any claims contained in a communication, the Human Rights Committee must ascertain, in accordance with rule 87 of its rules of procedure, whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. When it considers a communication under the Optional Protocol, the Committee must ascertain whether the communication satisfies the requirements laid down successively in theprovisions of the Optional Protocol. 5.2 In respect of the author’s claim that Mauritian Law does not provide for a retrial in cases in which fresh material evidence becomes available after the conclusion of the trial, the Committee notes that no substantiation Of such fresh material evidence has been made. Therefore, the author has failed to advance a claim under the Covenant within the meaning of article 2 of the Optional Protocol. In the case in question the complainant’s allegations, both concerning the violations of which he claims to have been a victim and concerning the domestic remedies available to him to have those allegations accepted, are not sufficiently well substantiated to permit the conclusion that, in submitting his communication, L.G. met the conditions set out in article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 5.3 As to the author’s claim that he has been unjustly denied re-instatement on the Roll of Barristers and that no remedy exists for this, the Committee notes that the author failed to apply for judicial review of the Chief Justice’s decision of 17 November 1989. Until he avails himself of the possibility of a judicial review, no issue under article 14 of the Covenant arises. The author’s claim is thus incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant within the meaning of article 3 of the Optional Protocol. APPENDIX II Individual opinion submitted by Mrs. Rosalyn Higgins and Mr. Amos Wako, pursuant to rule 92, paragraph 3, of the Committee’s rule of procedure, concerning the Committee’s decision to declare inadmissible communication No. 354/1989, L. G. v. Mauritius Article 14, paragraph 6, of the Covenant refers, inter alia, to what remedy is required when a person’s conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the basis of new or newly discovered facts. 6. The Human Rights Committee therefore decides: (a) That the communication is inadmissible; (b) That this decision shall be transmitted to the State party and to the author. Such reversal of conviction, or pardon, occurs in various ways in different jurisdictions. We wish to make it clear that the basis of the Committee’s decision, as explained in paragraph 5.2, should not be read as a finding by the Committee that article 14, paragraph 6, necessarily requires an entitlement to retrial. APPENDIX I Individual opinion submitted by Ms. Christine Chanet and Mr. Birame Ndiaye, pursuant to rule 92, paragraph 3, of the Committee’s rules of procedure, concerning the Committee’s decision to declare 14