the meaning of article 25(a) of the Covenant that every citizen may determine either to take part directly in the conduct of public affairs or to leave it to freely chosen representatives. It is for the legal and constitutional system of the State party to provide for the modalities of such participation. alleged violation of article 1 of the Covenant cannot be brought under the Optional Protocol.1 5.2 Article 25 of the Covenant stipulates that: “every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: 5.5 It must be beyond dispute that the conduct of public affairs in a democratic State is the task of representatives of the people, elected for that purpose, and public officials appointed in accordance with the law. Invariably, the conduct of public affairs affects the interest of large segments of the population or even the population as a whole, while in other instances it affects more directly the interest of more specific groups of society. Although prior consultations, such as public hearings or consultations with the most interested groups may often be envisaged by law or have evolved as public policy in the conduct of public affairs, article 25(a) of the Covenant cannot be understood as meaning that any directly affected group, large or small, has the unconditional right to choose the modalities of participation in the conduct of public affairs. That, in fact, would be an extrapolation of the right to direct participation by the citizens, far beyond the scope of article 25(a). (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections...; (c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service....” At issue in the present case is whether the constitutional conferences constituted a “conduct of public affairs” and if so, whether the authors, or any other representatives chosen for that purpose by the Mikmaq tribal society, had the right, by virtue of article 25(a), to attend the conferences. 5.3 The State party has informed the Committee that, as a general rule, constitutional conferences in Canada are attended only by the elected leaders of the federal and 10 provincial governments. In the light of the composition, nature and scope of activities of constitutional conferences in Canada, as explained by the State party, the Committee cannot but conclude that they do indeed constitute a conduct of public affairs. The fact that an exception was made, by inviting representatives of aboriginal peoples in addition to elected representatives to take part in the deliberations of the constitutional conferences on aboriginal matters, cannot change this conclusion. 6. Notwithstanding the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs without discrimination and without unreasonable restrictions, the Committee concludes that, in the specific circumstances of the present case, the failure of the State party to invite representatives of the Mikmaq tribal society to the constitutional conferences on aboriginal matters, which constituted conduct of public affairs, did not infringe that right of the authors or other members of the Mikmaq tribal society. Moreover, in the view of the Committee, the participation and representation at these conferences have not been subjected to unreasonable restrictions. Accordingly, the Committee is of the view that the communication does not disclose a violation of article 25 or any other provisions of the Covenant. 5.4 It remains to be determined what is the scope of the right of every citizen, without unreasonable restrictions, to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives. Surely, it cannot be 1 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Forth-fifth Session, Supplement No. 40, (A/45/40), vol. II, annex IX, sect. A, communication No. 167/1984 (Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada), Views adopted on 26 March 1990, para. 32.1. 42