he should not now be penalized for accepting the advice of Leading Counsel. Finally, it is submitted that recourse to the Judicial Committee in instances in which an application is likely to fail would involve the submission of a large number of unmeritorious petitions to the Judicial Committee, with damaging consequences for the judicial procedure before that body. Such a consequence, it is submitted, cannot have been the purpose of the rule laid down in article 5 of the Optional Protocol. 3.7 As to the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies, counsel recalls the Committee’s established jurisprudence that remedies must not only be available but also effective, and that the State party has an obligation to provide some evidence that there would be a reasonable prospect that domestic remedies would be effective. He submits that neither a petition for special leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council nor a constitutional motion in the Supreme (Constitutional) Court of Jamaica would provide effective remedies. 3.11 Counsel further asserts that a constitutional motion in the Supreme (Constitutional) Court does not provide the author with an effective domestic remedy. In this context, he advances three arguments: firstly, Section 25 of the Jamaican Constitution, which provides for the “enforcement” of the individual rights guaranteed under Chapter Three of the Constitution, including the right to a fair trial, would not provide an appropriate remedy in the circumstances of the case, as “enforcement” within the meaning of Section 25 would involve ordering a second re-trial which, more than 10 years after the murder of Mr. Johnson, is an impractical proposition. Secondly, it is submitted that the proviso to Section 25, paragraph 2, namely that the Supreme Court shall not exercise its powers if it is satisfied that adequate means of redress for the contravention alleged are, or have been, available to the applicant, applies to the author’s case. Finally, a constitutional remedy is not “available” to the author, because the State party does not grant legal aid for the purpose of filing constitutional motions in the Supreme Court, and lawyers in Jamaica are generally unwilling to argue such motions on a pro bono basis. 3.8 In this context, it is submitted that the case cannot be brought within the ambit of Section 110, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Jamaican Constitution governing the modalities under which the Court of Appeal may grant leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Firstly, at no stage in the judicial proceedings did a question as to the interpretation of the Jamaican Constitution arise, as required by Section 110, paragraph l(c). Secondly, the general criteria for granting leave to the Privy Council in Section 110, paragraph 2(a) (a question of great general or public importance or otherwise such that it ought to be submitted to the Privy Council) were not met in the case. 3.9 As to the power of the Judicial Committee, under Section 110, paragraph 3, of the Constitution, to grant special leave to appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal, counsel affirms that any application for special leave requires the submission of a legal opinion from Leading Counsel, to the effect that there is merit in seeking leave. In the author’s case, Leading Counsel, the President of the Bar Council (United Kingdom), has advised that the substantive issues involved do not fall within the narrow jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee. Leading Counsel considers that although there were weaknesses in the evidence against the author during his re-trial, as well as in the handling of the defence case, the likelihood of the Judicial Committee to grant special leave to appeal in respect of those matters would be remote. The State party’s observations 4. The State party, by submission of 20 July 1986, contends that the communication is inadmissible on the grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, since the author retains the right, under Section 11 of the Jamaican Constitution, to petition the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for special leave to appeal. It adds that it issued the written judgment of the Court of Appeal of Jamaica on 17 March 1986 and that it was available to the author and to his counsel; legal aid would be available to the author to petition the Judicial Committee pursuant to Section 3, paragraph 1, of the Poor Prisoners’ Defence Act. 3.10 To petition the Judicial Committee in the current circumstances would involve discarding highly qualified legal advice that such an avenue would be inappropriate; counsel submits that since the author has diligently considered the possibility of petitioning the Judicial Committee, 55