CAT/C/59/D/634/2014 subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances.22 9.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1, in which it is stated that the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. While the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable (para. 6), the Committee recalls that the burden of proof generally falls on the complainant, who must present an arguable case that he or she faces a foreseeable, real and personal risk. Although, under the terms of general comment No. 1, the Committee is free to assess the facts on the basis of the full set of circumstances in every case, considerable weight is given to the findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party concerned (para. 9). 9.5 The Committee notes the State party’s submission that, in the present case, the complainants have failed to substantiate that there are substantial grounds for believing that they are in danger of being subjected to torture if returned to the Russian Federation, that their claims have been reviewed by the Danish immigration authorities and that the latter found that the complainants would not risk persecution as set out in section 7 (1) of the Aliens Act or be in need of protection status as set out in section 7 (2) of the Act in case of their return to the Russian Federation. The Committee also notes that the complainants have submitted evidentiary documentation supporting the first complainant’s claims on the grounds for seeking protection, such as medical evidence corroborating his account of having experienced different forms of torture, including humiliating ones, on a number of occasions while in detention in the Russian Federation, as well as independent articles supporting his statements about the events that had triggered the authorities’ interest in him in November 2013. 9.6 The Committee further notes that the Danish immigration authorities based their decisions to reject the complainants’ asylum applications solely on the assessment of their credibility. As a consequence, the Committee considers that the aforementioned claims and evidentiary documentation have not been examined by them on the merits. In this context, the Committee observes that the complainants’ credibility was questioned primarily on the basis of a number of factual inconsistences in the first complainant’s statements made during the asylum proceedings, and recalls that complete accuracy is seldom to be expected from victims of torture. 23 Given the fact that the complainants’ counsel specifically requested the Refugee Appeals Board at the beginning of the hearing of their appeals against the decisions of the Danish Immigration Service to order an examination of the first complainant for signs of torture in order to prove his credibility, the Committee is of the view that an impartial and independent assessment of whether the reason for the inconsistences in his statements might be that he had been subjected to torture could have been made by the Board only after it had ordered the first complainant to be examined for signs of torture. Accordingly, the Committee considers that, while the State party has raised serious credibility concerns, it drew an adverse conclusion concerning credibility without adequately exploring a fundamental aspect of the first complainant’s claim.24 22 23 24 14 See, inter alia, communication No. 519/2012, T.M. v. Republic of Korea, decision adopted on 21 November 2014, para. 9.3. See Ke Chun Rong v. Australia, para. 7.5. See, inter alia, F.K. v. Denmark, para. 7.6.