CAT/C/52/D/475/2011 10.4 The Committee takes note of the State party’s submission that the complainant’s brother has failed to exhaust the available legal remedies in that, at the time of the submission, the appeals proceedings against the decision of the Migration Police to deny him refugee status had not been finalized, and that his communication was therefore inadmissible. The Committee, however, observes that the State party’s domestic law regulating the refugee status determination procedure allows the authorities to refuse refugee protection to an individual who arrived from the territory of a safe third State and to an individual regarding whom there are serious grounds to assume that he or she has participated in the activities of terrorist, extremist or banned religious organizations in the country of arrival or in the country of origin of the individual. The Committee recalls that article 3 of the Convention affords absolute protection against torture to anyone in the territory of a State party, regardless of the person’s character or the danger the person may pose to society.10 The Committee observes that the domestic refugee status determination procedure provides no such protection. Given those circumstances, the Committee concludes that the appeals against the refusal to grant refugee status before the State party’s courts do not constitute an effective remedy with regard to evaluation of the risk for the complainant’s brother of being subjected to torture on extradition. Consequently, the Committee considers that it is not precluded by article 22, paragraph 5 (b), of the Convention from examining the communication and proceeds to its examination on the merits. Consideration of the merits 11.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties concerned, in accordance with article 22, paragraph 4, of the Convention. 11.2 The issue before the Committee is whether the extradition of the complainant’s brother to Uzbekistan would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 11.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant’s brother would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture on return to Uzbekistan. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3, paragraph 2, of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of such a determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would return. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not of itself constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 11.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention, which states that “the risk of torture must be assessed on 10 10 See the Committee’s jurisprudence in communications No. 297/2006, Sogi v. Canada, decision adopted on 16 November 2007, para. 10.2 and No. 300/2006, Tebourski v. France, decision adopted on 1 May 2007, para. 8.2.