CAT/C/37/D/279/2005** Page 9 which he or she would return. It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute a sufficient ground for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his or her return to that country; additional grounds must exist to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Similarly, the absence of a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights does not mean that a person cannot be considered to be in danger of being subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 7.3 The Committee recalls its General Comment No.1 on article 3, which states that the Committee is obliged to assess whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be in danger of being subjected to torture were he/she to be expelled, returned or extradited, the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. However, the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable. The risk need not be highly probable, but it must be personal and present. In this regard, in its jurisprudence the Committee has determined that the risk of torture must be foreseeable, real and personal. 7.4 The Committee notes the claim that if the complainants are returned to Rwanda they will be detained and tortured, on the basis of the first named complainant’s involvement in the PDR-Ubuyanja party, for which reason she was detained and subjected to torture. She also fears that she may be tried before the Gacaca courts. On this latter issue, without wishing to consider whether the Gacaca courts meet international standards of due process, the Committee considers that fear of a future trial before them is in itself insufficient to amount to a reasonable fear of torture. 7.5 As to the first named complainant’s claim of past torture due to her political activism, the Committee notes that the State party questions her credibility due to her vagueness, inconsistency and lack of evidence in her account of and involvement in the PDR- Ubuyanja party and the argument that she would not suffer torture given the developments after the elections in 2003. The Committee notes that the State party did not contest, during the domestic proceedings, nor in its submission to the Committee, the first named complainant’s claim (supported by two medical reports) that she was repeatedly raped in detention, as a result of which she became pregnant, and gave birth to her son in Sweden. In fact, on a review of the decisions of the domestic authorities, it would appear that these medical reports were not taken into account at all and that the issue of whether or not the complainant had been raped and the consequences thereof for her and her son were not considered. Thus, on the basis of the medical evidence provided, and the State party’s failure to dispute the claim, the Committee considers that the first named complainant was repeatedly raped in detention and as such was subjected to torture in the past. On examining the dates of her detention and the date of birth of her son, the Committee considers it without doubt that he was the product of rape by public officials, and is thus a constant reminder to the first named complainant of her rape. 7.6 On the State party’s general argument that the first named complainant is not credible, the Committee recalls its jurisprudence that complete accuracy is seldom to be expected by victims of torture and that such inconsistencies as may exist in the complainant's presentation of the facts are not material and do not raise doubts about the general veracity of her claims, especially since it has been demonstrated that she was repeatedly subjected to rape in