102 Legal Digest of International Fair Trial Rights tions when the trial court seeks to evaluate the evidence against her/him. The European Court of Human Rights has accepted that the right to silence is not absolute so that, in situations that clearly call for an explanation to be given by an accused, the accused’s silence can be taken into account in assessing the persuasiveness of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and/or the credibility of an explanation later given by the accused.416 The European Court set up certain criteria to assess whether the drawing of adverse inferences from an accused’s silence infringes upon the notion of a fair hearing under article 6(1) of the ECHR. The Court will look at the circumstances of the case, having particular regard to the situations where inferences may be drawn, the weight attached to them by the national courts in their assessment of the evidence, and the degree of compulsion inherent in the situation.417 The European Court will also pay special attention to the trial judge’s direction to the jury on the issue of adverse inferences.418 In Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland, the European Court examined the inference drawn from silence pursuant to section 52 of the British Offenses Against the State Act 1939, according to which a refusal to provide information on a suspect’s movements makes that suspect liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months.419 The European Court inferred that “the degree of compulsion imposed on the applicants by the application of section 52 of the 1939 Act, with a view to compelling them to provide information relating to charges against them under that Act, in effect destroyed the very essence of their privilege against self-incrimination and their right to remain silent”.420 5.2.5 Psychological coercion to answer questions or confess guilt The Human Rights Committee has repeatedly held that the wording in article 14(3)(g) of the ICCPR (that no one shall be “compelled to testify against himself or confess guilt”) must be understood as prohibiting any direct or indirect physical (See also 5.2.6) or psychological coercion by the investigating authorities of the accused with a view to obtaining a confession of guilt.421 The European Court of Human Rights has gone further than this and taken the view that the right to silence is not confined to cases where duress has been brought to bear on an accused 416 John Murray v the United Kingdom [1996] ECHR 3, para 47; Condron v the United Kingdom [2000] ECHR 191, paras 56–57; Beckles v the United Kingdom [2002] ECHR 661, para 57. 417 John Murray v the United Kingdom [1996] ECHR 3, para 47 in fine; Condron v the United Kingdom [2000] ECHR 191, para 56. 418 Beckles v the United Kingdom [2002] ECHR 661, para 59 in fine. 419 Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland [2000] ECHR 684, para 24. 420 Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland [2000] ECHR 684, para 55. 421 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment 32 (2007), para 41. See also: Deolall v Guyana, HRC Communication 912/2000, UN Doc CCPR/C/82/D/912/2000 (2004), para 5.1; Singarasa v Sri Lanka, HRC Communication 1033/2001, UN Doc CCPR/C/81/D/1033/2001 (2004), para 7.4; and Khuseynova and Butaeva v Tajikistan, HRC Communication 1263/2004 and 1264/2004, UN Doc CCPR/ C/94/D/1263–1264/2004 (2008), para 8.3.