Chapter vi  Equality of Arms and Rights to a Fair Hearing 113 Both the Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights have been reluctant to rule on the admissibility of evidence (See also 6.7.4).451 This does not, however, do away with the fact that evidence must be heard, or otherwise taken, by a court or tribunal in a manner that achieves overall fairness, requiring, as explained by the European Court of Human Rights, that all evidence must, in principle, be produced in the presence of the accused at a public hearing with a view to permitting the conduct of an adversarial hearing.452 In Jansen-Gielen v the Netherlands, the Human Rights Committee found that there had been an inequality of arms. The Central Appeals Tribunal in the Netherlands had refused to append a psychological report to the case file that had been submitted by the applicant’s lawyer two days before the hearing. The Netherlands argued that the Court considered that admission of the report two days before the hearing would have unreasonably obstructed the other party in the conduct of the case. It refused to adjourn proceedings to allow admission of the report and consideration of it by the other party. The applicable procedural law did not, however, provide for a time limit for the submission of documents. The Committee, accordingly, found that it was the duty of the Court of Appeal, which was not constrained by any prescribed time limit, to ensure that each party could challenge the documentary evidence the other filed or wished to file and, if need be, to adjourn proceedings.453 Inequality in the presentation of one’s case may also affect the right to call witnesses (See also 6.7.1) or to appoint experts (See also 6.7.2) in order to present contradictory evidence. In Nazarov v Uzbekistan, for example, the defendant was accused to have been in the possession of hemp for the purpose of sale. Without giving reasons, the trial court refused his request for the appointment of an expert to determine the geographical origin of the hemp, which may have constituted crucial evidence for the trial. In the absence of any explanation for the reasons to refuse the defendant’s request, the Human Rights Committee concluded that this denial did not respect the requirement of equality between the prosecution and defence in producing evidence, and thereby amounted to a denial of justice.454 Because the opinion of an expert who has been appointed by the competent court to address issues arising in the case is likely to carry significant weight in the court’s assessment of those issues, the lack of neutrality on the part of an expert may give rise to a breach of the principle of equality of arms.455 Even the lack of the appearance of neutrality, where this can be objec 451 According to the Human Rights Committee: “it is primarily for the domestic legislatures of States Parties to determine the admissibility of evidence and how their courts assess it” – see UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment 32 (2007), para 39. According to the European Court of Human Rights: “It is for the domestic court to assess the credibility of witnesses and the relevance of evidence to the issues in the case” – see Mirilashvili v Russia [2008] ECHR 1669, para 161; Saïdi v France [1993] ECHR 39, para 43; Schenk v Switzerland [1988] ECHR 17, para 46; G. B. v France [2001] ECHR 564, para 59. 452 Van Mechelen and Others v the Netherlands [1997] ECHR 22, para 51; Barberá, Messegué and Jabardo v Spain [1998] ECHR 25, paras 76, 78 in fine; Mirilashvili v Russia [2008] ECHR 1669, para 162; G. B. v France [2001] ECHR 564, para 59; Dowsett v the United Kingdom [2003] ECHR 314, para 43. 453 Jansen-Gielen v the Netherlands, HRC Communication 846/1999, UN Doc CCPR/C/71/D/846/1999 (2001), para Ą8.2. 454 Nazarov v Uzbekistan, HRC Communication 911/2000, UN Doc CCPR/C/81/D/911/2000 (2004), para 6.3. 455 Bönisch v Austria [1985] ECHR, para 32; Sara Lind Eggertsdóttir v Iceland [2007] ECHR 553, para 47.