Chapter vi  Equality of Arms and Rights to a Fair Hearing 143 a death penalty case without consulting with the defendant624 and where counsel has been absent during the giving of evidence by a witness.625 Adopting the same approach, the European Court of Human Rights has concluded that, while the conduct of the defence is essentially a matter between the defendant and her/ his counsel, domestic courts should not remain passive vis-à-vis instances of lack of effective legal representation.626 When the circumstances of the case require, the court should inquire into the manners in which a lawyer fulfils her/his responsibilities.627 If the authorities are notified of a situation where the lawyer appointed has been prevented from acting for a protracted period, through illness or other reasons, or is shirking her/his duties, the authorities must either replace legal counsel or cause her/him to fulfil the obligations required of providing competent and effective legal representation.628 The court should behave pro-actively, including, for example, by making an order for adjournment of the trial, even where this has not been requested by counsel.629 In the case of counsel provided by the competent authorities, the Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights seems willing to impose an even higher duty of care on the part of the presiding judge.630 In Sannino v Italy, the European Court emphasized that the applicant’s failure to inform the authorities of the difficulties he faced in preparing his defence could not, of itself, relieve the authorities of their obligation to take steps to guarantee the effectiveness of the accused’s defence. The competent national authorities are required to intervene not only if a failure by legal-aid counsel to provide effective representation is “manifest” but also if it is sufficiently brought to their attention in some other way.631 As to the independence of counsel, the Human Rights Committee has commented that “lawyers should be able to advise and to represent persons charged with a criminal offence in accordance with generally recognized professional ethics without restrictions, influence, pressure or undue interference from any quarter”.632 624 Kelly v Jamaica, HRC Communication 253/1987, UN Doc CCPR/C/41/D/253/1987 (1991), para 9.5. 625 Hendricks v Guyana, HRC Communication 838/1998, UN Doc CCPR/C/76/D/838/1998 (2002), para 6.4; and Brown v Jamaica, HRC Communication 775/1997, UN Doc CCPR/C/65/D/775/1997 (1999), para 6.6. 626 Sannino v Italy [2006] ECHR 508, para 49; Cuscani v the United Kingdom [2002] ECHR 630, para 39. 627 Daud v Portugal [1998] ECHR 27, para 42. 628 Artico v Italy [1980] ECHR 4, para 33; Goddi v Italy [1984] ECHR 4, para 31; Kamasinski v Austria [1989] ECHR 24, paras 33, 65; and Daud v Portugal [1998] ECHR 27, para 38. 629 Daud v Portugal [1998] ECHR 27, para 42. 630 Contrast H. C. v Jamaica, HRC Communication 383/1989, UN Doc CCPR/C/45/D/383/1989 (1992), para 6.3 (private counsel) with: Kelly v Jamaica, HRC Communication 253/1987, UN Doc CCPR/C/41/D/253/1987 (1991), para 9.5; Brown v Jamaica, HRC Communication 775/1997, UN Doc CCPR/C/65/D/775/1997 (1999), para 6.6; and Hendricks v Guyana, HRC Communication 838/1998, UN Doc CCPR/C/76/D/838/1998 (2002), para 6.4. 631 Sannino v Italy [2006] ECHR 508, para 49–51; Kamasinski v Austria [1989] ECHR 24, para 65; Daud v Portugal [1998] ECHR 27, para 38. 632 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment 32 (2007), para 34. See also International Principles on the Independence and Accountability of Judges, Lawyers and Prosecutors – Practitioners