Chapter vi  Equality of Arms and Rights to a Fair Hearing 145 tical and effective.639 The Human Rights Committee found a violation of Article 14(3)(b) of the ICCPR, for example, where all meetings between a defendant and his lawyer had been required to be held in the presence of investigators.640 It has also treated a lack of privacy between a lawyer and his client as a violation of Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR, in Arutyuniantz v Uzbekistan.641 The right to confidential and privileged communications applies to all communications between a lawyer and client, irrespective of the stage at which the communications occur. Lack of privacy has been held to violate the right to counsel during the preparation of one’s defence (See also 6.3.3), expressly provided for in Article 14(3)(b) of the ICCPR and implicit in Article 6(1), juncto 6(3)(c), of the ECHR, as well as the right to counsel during one’s defence (See also 6.6.3), expressly provided for in Article 14(3)(b) of the ICCPR and in Article 6(3)(c) of the ECHR. In the context of detention or imprisonment, the need for confidentiality is even more justified. It is for this reason that interviews between a detained or imprisoned person and her/his legal counsel may be within sight, but not within the hearing, of a law enforcement official.642 The European Court of Human Rights has also held that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided from the moment of the first interrogation of a suspect by the police (See also 6.3.3).643 The European Court has, nevertheless, concluded that the right to access to a lawyer may be subject to restrictions for good cause.644 In such cases, the question will be whether the restriction was necessary to achieve a legitimate aim and proportional to that end, and whether the restriction, in light of the entirety of the proceedings, deprived the accused of a fair hearing.645 In Brennan v the United Kingdom, the Court considered a situation where the accused’s first consultation with legal counsel was monitored by a police officer, pursuant to Section 45 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991, which allowed the monitoring of consultations for the purpose of preventing information being passed on to suspects still at large. While acknowledging that this was a legitimate aim, the European Court found that there was no allegation that counsel was, in fact, likely to collaborate in such an attempt and that it was unclear to what extent a police officer would have been able to spot a coded 639 S. v Switzerland [1991] ECHR 54, para 48; Öcalan v Turkey [2005] ECHR 282, para 133. 640 Khomidova v Tajikistan, HRC Communication 1117/2002, UN Doc CCPR/C/81/D/1117/2002 (2004), para 6.4. See also UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment 32 (2007), para 34; Gridin v Russian Federation, HRC Communication 770/1997, UN Doc CCPR/C/69/D/770/1997 (2000), para 8.5 and Sigareva v Uzbekistan, HRC Communication 907/2000, UN Doc CCPR/C/85/D/907/2000 (2005), para 6.3. 641 Arutyuniantz v Uzbekistan, HRC Communication 971/2001, UN Doc CCPR/C/83/D/971/2001 (2005), para 6.3. 642 UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Principle 18 (4) adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1988; UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 1990, para 8. 643 Salduz v Turkey [2008] ECHR 1542, paras 52, 54. 644 Salduz v Turkey [2008] ECHR 1542, para 52. 645 S. v Switzerland [1991] ECHR 54, para 48; and Brennan v the United Kingdom [2001] ECHR 596, para 60.