Chapter iii  Right to a Hearing by a Competent, Independent and Impartial Tribunal Established by Law 53 has referred to the concept of tribunal, in the substantive sense of this expression,168 as not necessarily being a court of law in the classic sense integrated within the standard judicial machinery of the country.169 The main characteristics of a “tribunal” within the meaning of Article 6 are the power to give a binding decision that may not be altered by a non-judicial authority (See also 3.2.2),170 combined with a mandate to determine matters within the tribunal’s competence “on the basis of rules of law, following proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner”.171 The right to a trial before an independent and impartial tribunal established by law engages three principal considerations: first, that the tribunal is one established by law (See also 3.1); second, that the tribunal is competent to decide on matters brought before it (See also 3.2); and, third, that the tribunal is both independent and impartial (See also 3.3). It is the independence and impartiality of courts and tribunals that the Human Rights Committee and European Court of Human Rights have focused most on. Claims brought before the Committee and the Court frequently mix issues of competence, establishment, independence and impartiality and, where this occurs, matters are often decided on the question of independence and impartiality. Also of relevance is the question of the independence, or autonomy, of prosecutors, including the extent to which prosecutors must act in an impartial way (See also 3.4). In the exercise of a tribunal’s function to enforce the fair and professional conduct of legal proceedings, it is also relevant to briefly note the question of contempt of court (See also 3.5). The Human Rights Committee has spoken of the requirements of competence, independence and impartiality as absolute, i.e., not capable of being subject to any exception.172 However, during a state of emergency threatening the life of the nation, it may be possible to derogate from certain rights and freedoms, which means that the right to a fair and public hearing may be subject to legitimate restrictions that are strictly required by the exigencies of the emergency situation if this is an emergency declared under Article 4 of the ICCPR or Article 15 of the ECHR. Notwithstanding this possibility, the Human Rights Committee explains that the denial of certain fair trial rights can never occur, even in an emergency situation, because “the principles of legality and the rule of law require that fundamental requirements of fair trial must be respected during a state of emergency”.173 This includes the principle that only a court of law can try and convict a person for a criminal offence, i.e., only a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.174 168 Sramek v Austria [1984] ECHR 12, para 36; Belilos v Switzerland [1988] ECHR 4, para 64. 169 Campbell and Fell v the United Kingdom [1984] ECHR 8, para 76. 170 Findlay v the United Kingdom [1997] ECHR 8, para 77; Van de Hurk v the Netherlands [1994] ECHR 14, para 45. 171 Sramek v Austria [1984] ECHR 12, para 36; Belilos v Switzerland [1988] ECHR 4, para 64. 172 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment 32 (2007), para 19. See also González del Rio v Peru, HRC Communication 263/1987, UN Doc CCPR/C/46/D/263/1987 (1992), para 5.2. 173 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment 29 (2001), para 16. 174 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment 29 (2001), para 16.