64 Legal Digest of International Fair Trial Rights est, thus ensuring that the internal organization prevent the exercise of different functions within the judicial process by the same person;236 and, second, a specific duty on the part of individual judges to recuse themselves from cases where there might be an appearance of such a conflict.237 To determine whether these duties are engaged, the test to be applied is whether the reasonable observer would view the situation as one in which legitimate doubt is raised as to the impartiality of the judicial officer(s). The Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights have stated that although the standpoint of those claiming that there is reason to doubt a judge’s impartiality is significant, “[w]hat is decisive is whether the fear can be objectively justified”.238 This means that the fear must be a reasonable one.239 In Castedo v Spain, the applicant’s apprehensions as to the impartiality of the judge were found to be objectively justified in circumstances where the judge was also an employee of one of the parties (a university), where the judge worked as an associate lecturer.240 The European Court has similarly explained that there need not be any suggestion of actual bias.241 Even appearances may be of a certain importance or, as stated in an English maxim quoted by the European Court: “justice must not only be done, it must also be seen to be done”.242 Many instances where objective impartiality is called into question concern situations where a judge plays different roles or functions in the course of the proceedings (prosecutorial and judicial, or advisory and judicial) or has taken part in different stages of same proceeding (as a first instance, and then as appeal judge). The fact that a judge has acted in different capacities in the same case (for instance prosecutorial and judicial) may, in certain circumstances, compromise a tribunal’s impartiality.243 In Piersack v Belgium, the fact that a judge had presided over a criminal trial after having been the head of the public prosecutor’s office in charge of the prosecution of the particular 236 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment 32 (2007), para 19; Kyprianou v Cyprus [2005] ECHR 873, para 121. 237 Piersack v Belgium [1982] ECHR 6, para 30 a) in fine; Hauschildt v Denmark [1989] ECHR 7, para 48. 238 Castedo v Spain, HRC Communication 1122/2002, UN Doc CCPR/C/94/1122/2002 (2008), para 9.7; Kyprianou v Cyprus [2005] ECHR 873, para 118; Wettstein v Switzerland [2000] ECHR 695, para 44; Ferrantelli and Santangelo v Italy [1996] ECHR 29, para 58; Jasinski v Poland [2005] ECHR 883, para 53; Sara Lind Eggertsdóttir v Iceland [2007] ECHR 553, para 42. 239 Holm v Sweden [1993] ECHR 58, paras 33–34; Jasinski v Poland [2005] ECHR 883, para 54 in fine; Ferrantelli and Santangelo v Italy [1996] ECHR 29, para 58. 240 Castedo v Spain, HRC Communication 1122/2002, UN Doc CCPR/C/94/1122/2002 (2008), para 9.8. See also Procola v Luxembourg [1995] ECHR 33, para 37, and contrast with Kleyn and Others v the Netherlands [2003] ECHR 226, paras 193–195. 241 Wettstein v Switzerland [2000] ECHR 695, para 43. 242 Delcourt v Belgium [1970] ECHR 1, para 31; De Cubber v Belgium [1984] ECHR 14, para 26; Mežnarić v Croatia [2005] ECHR 497, para 32. 243 Huber v Switzerland [1990] ECHR 25, para 43; Brincat v Italy [1992] ECHR 71 paras 20–22; Assenov and Others v Bulgaria [1998] ECHR 98, para 146; Kyprianou v Cyprus [2005] ECHR 873, para 126.