70 Legal Digest of International Fair Trial Rights b. The situation in which a civilian must appear before a court composed, if only in part, of members of the armed forces seriously undermines the confidence that courts ought to inspire in a democratic society;274 c. When a court is composed solely of military judges the concern is all the more valid. Only in very exceptional circumstances could the determination of criminal charges against civilians by such courts be held to be compatible with Article 6 of ECHR;275 and d. The jurisdiction of military criminal justice should not extend to civilians unless there are compelling reasons justifying such a situation, and if so only on a clear and foreseeable legal basis. The existence of such reasons must be substantiated in each specific case. It is not sufficient for the national legislation to allocate certain categories of offences to military courts in abstracto.276 In order to safeguard the rights of an accused under Article 14(1) and (3) of the ICCPR, the Committee has commented that judges in military or special courts should have the authority to consider any allegations made of violations of the rights of the accused during any stage of the prosecution.277 3.3.5 Tribunals of faceless judges The Human Rights Committee has also considered resort to tribunals of “faceless judges” – tribunals composed of anonymous judges – which has usually occurred in South American countries within measures taken to fight terrorist activities. The initial approach of the Human Rights Committee to such cases was to treat trials before faceless judges as automatically failing to guarantee the independence and impartiality of the judges.278 In De Polay v Peru and Vivanco v Peru, however, Committee member Ivan Shearer took the view that the Committee’s views do not amount to condemnation of the practice of “faceless justice” in itself and in all circumstances. It was acknowledged that the practice of masking or otherwise concealing the identity of judges in special cases – practiced in some countries by reason of serious threats to their security caused by terrorism or other forms of organized crime – may become a necessity for the protection of judges and of the administration of justice. When States are faced with such an extraordinary situation, however, Committee member Shearer advocated that they should take the steps set out in Article 4 of the ICCPR to derogate from their obligations, in particular those arising from Article 14, but only to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.279 274 Ergin v Turkey [2006] ECHR 529, para 43; Öcalan v Turkey [2005] ECHR 282, para 116; Incal v Turkey [1998] ECHR 48, para 72. 275 Ergin v Turkey [2006] ECHR 529, para 44. 276 Ergin v Turkey [2006] ECHR 529, para 47. 277 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment 13 (1984), para 15. 278 De Polay v Peru, HRC Communication 577/1994, UN Doc CCPR/C/61/D/577/1994 (1997); Vivanco v Peru, HRC Communication 678/1996, UN Doc CCPR/C/74/D/678/1996 (2002), para 7.1. See also Gomez v Peru, HRC Communication 981/2001, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/981/2001 (2003), para 7.3. 279 De Polay v Peru, HRC Communication 577/1994, UN Doc CCPR/C/61/D/577/1994 (1998). See also Arredondo v Peru, HRC Communication 688/1996, UN Doc CCPR/C/69/D/688/1996 (2000).