Chapter vi  Equality of Arms and Rights to a Fair Hearing 149 Rights, therefore, considers the refusal of legal aid on grounds such as the lack of sufficient prospects of success as legitimate in principle.669 In the case of appeals against, or applications for constitutional review of, death penalty cases, the Human Rights Committee has consistently concluded that the State is obliged to provide free legal assistance.670 The Human Rights Committee has also pointed out that States Parties to the ICCPR have an obligation, under Article 2(3) of the Covenant, to ensure that effective remedies are available in relation to claims of violations of rights under the ICCPR. In Kennedy v Trinidad and Tobago, the Constitutional Court of Trinidad and Tobago was the body charged with this task. As such, the Committee considered that the denial of legal aid to a person presenting a claim to the Constitutional Court constituted a violation of Article 14(1), in conjunction with Article 2(3).671 It should be noted that the Human Rights Committee has been reluctant to examine the manner in which a State Party administers the provision of legal aid within its territory. Although it has acknowledged a responsibility on the part of States Parties to provide effective legal aid representation, it said in Ricketts v Jamaica that it is not for the Committee to determine how this should be ensured, unless it is apparent that there has been a miscarriage of justice.672 An instance in which it found such an apparent miscarriage of justice was in the case of Teesdale v Trinidad and Tobago, where counsel was not assigned until the day of the accused’s trial. 673A similar stance has been adopted by the European Court of Human Rights, observing on several occasions that the Contracting States to the ECHR enjoy considerable freedom in the choice of the means of ensuring that their legal systems satisfy the requirements of free legal assistance. However, it is the European Court’s task to determine whether the method chosen leads to results that are consistent with the requirements of the ECHR.674 669 As an exception, see: Sialkowska v Poland [2007] ECHR 223, para 114–115; Staroszczyk v Poland [2007] ECHR 222, para 135–137. 670 Currie v Jamaica, HRC Communication 377/1989, UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/377/1989 (1994), para 13.4; Shaw v Jamaica, HRC Communication 704/1996, UN Doc CCPR/C/62/D/704/1996 (1998), para 7.6; Taylor v Jamaica, HRC Communication 707/1996, UN Doc CCPR/C/60/D/707/1996 (1997), para 8.2; Henry v Trinidad and Tobago, HRC Communication 752/1997, UN Doc CCPR/C/64/D/752/1997 (1999), para 7.6; and Kennedy v Trinidad and Tobago, HRC Communication 845/1999, UN Doc CCPR/C/74/D/845/1998 (2002), para 7.10. 671 Kennedy v Trinidad and Tobago, HRC Communication 845/1999, UN Doc CCPR/C/74/D/845/1998 (2002), para 7.10. See also Evans v Trinidad and Tobago, HRC Communication 908/2000, UN Doc CCPR/ C/77/D/908/2000 (2003), para 6.6. 672 Ricketts v Jamaica, HRC Communication 667/1995, UN Doc CCPR/C/74/D/667/1995 (2002), para 7.3. See also Burrell v Jamaica, HRC Communication 546/1993, UN Doc CCPR/C/53/D/546/1993 (1996); Amore v Jamaica, HRC Communication 634/1995, UN Doc CCPR/C/65/D/634/1995 (1999); Darwish v Austria, HRC Communication 679/1996, UN Doc CCPR/C/60/D/679/1996 (1997); and Agudo v Spain, HRC Communication 864/1999, UN Doc CCPR/C/76/D/864/1999 (2002). 673 Teesdale v Trinidad and Tobago, HRC Communication 677/1996, UN Doc CCPR/C/74/D/677/1996 (2002), para 9.5. 674 Quaranta v Switzerland [1991] ECHR 33, para 30.